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Labor Pains: Change in Organizational
Models and Employee Turnover in Young,
High-Tech Firms1
James N. Baron and Michael T. Hannan
Stanford University
M. Diane Burton
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Organizational theories, especially ecological perspectives, empha-
size the disruptive effects of change. However, the mechanisms pro-
ducing these effects are seldom examined explicitly. This article ex-
amines one such mechanism—employee turnover. Analyzing a
sample of high-technology start-ups, we show that changes in the
employment models or blueprints embraced by organizational lead-
ers increase turnover, which in turn adversely affects subsequent
organizational performance. Turnover associated with organiza-
tional change appears to be concentrated among the most senior
employees, suggesting “old guard disenchantment” as the primary
cause. The results are consistent with the claim of neoinstitutionalist
scholars that founders impose cultural blueprints on nascent organ-
izations and with the claim of organizational ecologists that altering
such blueprints is disruptive and destabilizing.
INTRODUCTION
Models of the employment relationship play an important—if not always
explicit—role in contemporary theories of organizations. Notwithstanding
1 This research was supported by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and the Stanford
Graduate School of Business, particularly the Center for Entrepreneurial Studies.
Baron also received generous support from a Marvin Bower Fellowship at Harvard
Business School and from the Robert and Marilyn Jaedicke Faculty Fellowship at
Stanford Business School while conducting this research; Hannan was supported by
the Stanford Graduate School of Business Faculty Trust. We received helpful comments
and suggestions from Bill Barnett, Peter Cappelli, Glenn Carroll, Robert Gibbons,
Charles Holloway, David Kreps, Barbara Lubben, Craig Olson, Charles O’Reilly,
Canice Prendergast, Toby Stuart, and seminar participants at the University of Wis-
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their other differences, numerous perspectives affirm the idea that organ-
izations embrace particular culturally accepted logics or blueprints for
organizing, including a model of how employment relations should be
structured. These models are claimed, in turn, to guide subsequent or-
ganizational evolution and to be resistant to change. For instance, in
discussing organizational inertia, population ecologists have argued that
survival prospects are enhanced by organizational features that promote
reliability and accountability, including a coherent system for managing
employees: “Testing for accountability is especially intense during organ-
ization building. . . . When membership involves an employment relation,
potential members often want guarantees that careers within the organ-
ization are managed in some rational way” (Hannan and Freeman 1984,
p. 153). Among the most important factors in fostering reliability and
accountability, according to organizational ecologists, are clearly specified
forms of authority and well-understood bases of exchange between mem-
bers and the organization. Hence, organizations stand to benefit by de-
veloping and institutionalizing coherent blueprints for employment re-
lations that can foster reliability and accountability; once such a blueprint
gets adopted, it is risky and costly for organizations to alter it.
Neoinstitutional perspectives also emphasize the importance of nor-
mative or cultural blueprints in shaping organization building and or-
ganizational evolution (e.g., Guille´n 1994; Fligstein and Byrkjeflot 1996).
According to these accounts, the designers of organizations draw on cul-
turally appropriate templates and conceptions of control in crafting struc-
tures, work roles, and employment relations because this enhances or-
ganizational legitimacy and because their own prior socialization and
enculturation presumably preclude doing otherwise (Fligstein 1987, 1990).
Organizational economists have made similar arguments about the
value of distinctive and coherent human-resources systems and their in-
ertial tendencies (Milgrom and Roberts 1995). Organizations benefit from
a coherent, consistent, and well-understood philosophy and set of practices
governing human resource management because: (1) they benefit from
technical complementarities among specific personnel practices (Milgrom
and Roberts 1992, chap. 4)—for instance, investments in training increase
the value of policies that reduce turnover, and vice versa; (2) learning is
simplified and accelerated; and (3) the organization can more readily dif-
ferentiate itself from competitors, helping it attract workers well-suited
to the kinds of jobs and values the firm has on offer. These benefits are
particularly likely to be realized when the organization’s model (e.g., an
consin, the University of Chicago, and the Wharton School, none of whom should be
blamed for any remaining defects in the finished product. Direct correspondence to
James N. Baron, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, Cali-
fornia 94305-5015. E-mail: baron_james@gsb.stanford.edu
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ironclad bureaucracy or a familial clan) resonates with behavioral scripts
or blueprints familiar to prospective and current employees from their
experiences in other settings (Baron and Kreps 1999, chap. 3). Yet strong
complementarities and interdependencies among various facets of an or-
ganization’s model make changes in any particular element more difficult
and costly.
These various arguments suggest that organizational models regarding
employment relations should be resistant to change and that efforts to
redraw blueprints should be disruptive. Indeed, according to organiza-
tional ecologists, efforts to alter the premises governing employment re-
lations should be among the most disruptive types of organizational
change. Changes in these premises can obsolesce skills and routines that
employees have learned, alter bases of power and status within the or-
ganization, and violate the implicit or explicit contracts specifying the
expectations and entitlements of employees vis-a`-vis the firm. Therefore,
efforts by firms to implement change along these dimensions should in-
crease discord and employee turnover. For instance, consider recent efforts
by health care organizations to implement performance evaluation and
reward systems for physicians based on patient volume. These changes
have proved enormously contentious and sparked unionization efforts and
rancor within the profession, precisely because they promote behaviors
and values that conflict with most physicians’ basic premises about their
role (Greenhouse 1999).
Yet, the destabilizing effects of fundamental organizational changes
have been assumed more than tested in organizational research. Numerous
studies have documented that some type of organizational change (in
strategy, top leadership, etc.) has deleterious consequences for organiza-
tional performance or survival (for reviews, see Barnett and Carroll [1995]
and Carroll and Hannan [2000]), which are often attributed to the internal
disruption, rancor, and turnover of personnel wrought by changes in val-
ues, routines, working relationships, and requisite skills. In this article,
we examine empirically whether changes to the organizational model
embraced by the founder(s) have disruptive effects, which we operation-
alize by focusing on labor force turnover and organizational performance.
Turnover is particularly disruptive in the setting we examine—high-tech
start-ups in Silicon Valley—for at least two reasons: the acute shortage
of scientific, technical, and engineering talent facing these organizations;
and the fact that, for many technology start-ups, employee turnover risks
losing the firm’s most precious asset, its human capital.
These analyses speak to several important issues for organizational
scholarship. First, they explore the validity and utility of the notion that
culturally based scripts, templates, or blueprints are imprinted on organ-
izations at their founding. In prior research, we have documented the
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existence of distinct organizational blueprints or models—different sets
of premises governing the employment relation—among the founders of
high-technology start-ups in Silicon Valley. We have demonstrated that
these blueprints shaped various aspects of organizational evolution, in-
cluding bureaucratization and administrative intensity, the development
of the HR function, and even the odds of replacing the founder with a
new chief executive officer (CEO) and of going public (Baron, Burton,
and Hannan 1996, 1999; Baron, Hannan, and Burton 1999a, 1999b; Han-
nan, Burton, and Baron 1996; Burton 1995). If these blueprints represent
part of the “hard wiring” of an enterprise and shape the expectations that
employees and firms have of one another, then changing the blueprint
should have demonstrable consequences, including heightened turnover.
Second, our analyses address the general claim that fundamental change
destabilizes organizations. Third, labor force turnover is, of course, an
inherently important organizational outcome, which has received consid-
erable attention from social scientists (for reviews, see Price [1977] and
Mobley [1982]). Whatever its relation to performance, turnover surely
affects organizational life (Staw 1980; Pfeffer 1983). Two otherwise iden-
tical organizations with persistent differences in turnover will evolve very
different tenure distributions, with implications for stability and change
in organizational culture (Carroll and Harrison 1998). Finally, we believe
the models and methods we employ might prove useful to researchers
interested in depicting organizational founding conditions and assessing
their enduring effects.
We begin by describing the sample, the organizational setting, and our
typology of employment models. We then formulate and test predictions
relating labor force turnover to changes in the employment blueprint. We
assess whether the turnover wrought by changing the employment blue-
print is disruptive for organizations in two ways: (1) by specifying and
testing hypotheses concerning how that turnover is patterned (i.e., who
is most likely to depart); and (2) by analyzing the effects of labor force
turnover on organizational performance (revenue growth). We test these
predictions with pooled cross-section time-series data describing annual
turnover rates and various organizational change events for more than
100 organizations between 1991 and 1995.
THE STANFORD PROJECT ON EMERGING COMPANIES (SPEC)
A panel study of young, high-technology firms in California’s Silicon
Valley, SPEC examines the evolution of employment practices, organi-
zational designs, and business strategies. The SPEC project seeks to un-
derstand how human resource systems get established. The focus on firms
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in a single region and sector of economic activity holds constant key labor
market and environmental conditions, as well as some of the institutional
influences asserted to shape labor force turnover. Within the Silicon Valley
region, we sought industries containing sufficient numbers of comparable
firms to allow quantitative comparisons; accordingly, we concentrated on
firms engaged in computer hardware and/or software, telecommunications
(including networking equipment), medical and biological technologies,
and semiconductors. We assumed organizations must reach a minimum
size before needing formal systems or practices; accordingly, we required
that firms in our study have at least 10 employees when sampled.2 We
also wanted to understand how founding conditions and early decisions
affect subsequent organizational evolution, which necessitates information
about the earliest days of the organization. We assumed individuals could
only reliably recall fairly recent information; consequently, we limited the
sample to firms no more than 10 years old when first visited in 1994–95
(the typical firm was six years old).3
DATA COLLECTION
Survey, interview, and archival methods were used to gather information
on each firm (see Burton 1995). Trained MBA and doctoral students con-
ducted semistructured interviews with the current CEO. The CEO was
2 In 1994, we identified 676 technology firms in Silicon Valley founded within these
industries during the previous ten years and having more than 10 employees, according
to two commercial databases on Silicon Valley technology companies: Rich’s Everyday
Sales Prospecting Guide (1994); and the Technology Resource Guide to Greater Silicon
Valley (1993/4), published by CorpTech. From that group, 250 firms were selected
according to a stratified sampling plan described in Baron, Burton, and Hannan (1996,
fig. 1). Of the 250 firms to whom we wrote (some of which had gone out of business,
left the area, or been acquired by the time we contacted them), 109 agreed to participate.
Utilizing the same sampling frame, we contacted 94 additional companies in 1995 (of
168 that were added to the 1995 edition of the CorpTech directory); 42 agreed to be
studied. Finally, we supplemented the sample by contacting 32 very young firms (not
listed in CorpTech), which we identified by tracking the Silicon Valley business press;
22 of these firms participated. We further enlarged the sample in 1997–98 by soliciting
participation from very young firms, including enterprises in the newly emerging In-
ternet sector. However, we were only able to obtain turnover data for several of these
firms, whose responses conceivably reflect a different time period, labor market, and
business environment than the rest of the firms in our sample confronted. Consequently,
we did not include those several firms in the analyses reported here.
3 About 10% of firms proved to be more than 10 years old when we first visited them.
In some cases, for example, our interviews revealed that the inception of the organi-
zation occurred somewhat earlier than the date of legal incorporation used in con-
structing our sampling plan. Even employing the most liberal definition of “founding,”
however, only three firms in the sample analyzed here had existed for more than 12
years when we first visited them.
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asked to identify the founder (or member of the founding team) best
equipped to provide information regarding the firm’s origins; and the best
informant regarding human resources (HR) practices in the organization.
We followed up with these informants about company history and HR
(respectively) and asked them to return completed surveys to us prior to
being interviewed. The company history survey solicited details about the
firm’s founding and subsequent milestones. The HR survey sought in-
formation about workforce demographics and a variety of employment
policies and practices. Information from the surveys, when available, was
used to guide interviews with informants in each company.
FOUNDERS’ ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS
As noted above, recent neoinstitutional work invokes the notion of cul-
turally based logics, blueprints, scripts, or conceptions of control. Yet
researchers have seldom tried to operationalize such blueprints directly,
tending instead to infer their existence from other sources of information.
Testing the proposition that altering founders’ initial blueprints for or-
ganizing and for structuring employment relations is disruptive demands
a method for measuring those blueprints.
In designing the study, we knew from the extant literature that con-
ceptions of employment relationships could vary along numerous dimen-
sions, and we were unsure a priori which dimension(s) would be most
relevant in our setting. Accordingly, we used open-ended interviews to
gather information. We asked each founder whether he or she had “an
organizational model or blueprint in mind when (you) founded the com-
pany.” (The CEO was asked a parallel question about the period corre-
sponding to the date of the interview.) We inductively analyzed transcripts
of interviews with founders and CEOs. Those analyses indicated that
interviewee’s images regarding how work and employment should be
organized varied along three main dimensions—attachment, coordination/
control, and selection—each characterized by three or four fairly distinct
options or approaches from which organizational architects seemed to be
selecting. (For descriptions of these different response categories and il-
lustrative quotes from interview transcripts, see Burton [1999].) Based on
the interview transcripts, members of the research team coded or classified
responses of each founder and each CEO on these three dimensions, unless
missing data precluded this.4 In previous work, we have shown that these
4 Two senior researchers on the project independently coded the three dimensions for
all firms, based on transcripts of interviews with founders and with CEOs. Many
respondents indicated that more than one option for a dimension was relevant to their
conception of the employment model; for instance, almost all regarded compensation
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three dimensions cohere and can be used to characterize the implicit
organizational model or blueprint of the founder and of the CEO at the
time our team first visited each firm (for an overview and additional
details, see Burton [1995] and Baron and Kreps [1999], chap. 19). Here
we briefly summarize the approach.
Attachment.—Founders articulated three different bases of employee
attachment, which we label love, work, and money. Some founders en-
visioned creating a strong family-like feeling and an intense emotional
bond with the workforce that would inspire superior effort and increase
retention of highly sought employees, thereby avoiding the frequent mo-
bility of key technical personnel that plagues Silicon Valley start-ups.
What binds the employee to the firm in this model is a sense of personal
belonging and identification with the company—in a sense, love. Many
SPEC firms pursue cutting-edge technology, and the primary motivator
for their employees is the desire to work at the technological frontier.
Recognizing this, many founders anticipated providing opportunities for
interesting and challenging work as the basis for attracting, motivating,
and (perhaps) retaining employees.5 Here, employees were not expected
to be loyal to the organization, the supervisor, or even coworkers per se,
but instead to a project. Finally, other founders’ responses indicated that
they regarded the employment relationship as a simple exchange of labor
for money.
Basis of coordination and control.—A second dimension concerned the
principal means of coordinating and controlling work. The most common
conception involved extensive reliance on informal control through peers
as relevant to retention, even if they regarded, say, exciting work as more important.
Hence, the coding task sought to select the option on each dimension that the re-
spondent indicated as dominant in his/her thinking about the dimension. Some re-
spondents were unable or unwilling to give priority to one option. Therefore, it was
important that we use explicit default rules for responses that did not fall neatly into
one of our categories. We used the following defaults: skills for selection, work for
attachment, and peer-based control for coordination/control. In effect, this makes the
engineering model the default (see below). We interpreted the default rules as follows:
unless the respondent clearly indicated that some other option was more important
than the default, we coded the response as the default category. After independently
coding each firm on all three dimensions for the founder and CEO responses, the two
researchers compared their two sets of codings. In the large majority of cases, they
were the same. When they were not, we scrutinized the transcripts looking for am-
biguities that might have led the two coders to disagree. In most cases, we decided
that the difference was due to some opacity in the response and therefore settled on
the default code.
5 A few founders also spoke about providing unrivaled “opportunity” for prospective
employees. Although opportunity is potentially a conceptually distinct basis of attach-
ment, it was closely aligned with “challenging work” and there were very few such
cases in our sample. Hence, we treated these cases as instances of attachment based
on “work.”
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or organizational culture. Other founders intended to rely on professional
control, even if they did not explicitly use this terminology. They took it
for granted that workers were committed to excellence in their work and
could perform at high levels because they had been professionally so-
cialized to do so. (Not surprisingly, this approach tends to be accompanied
by an emphasis on hiring high-potential individuals from elite institu-
tions.) Professional control emphasizes autonomy and independence rather
than enculturation. A third group of founders espoused a more traditional
view of control as embedded in formal procedures and systems. Finally,
some founders indicated that they planned to control and coordinate work
personally, by direct oversight, reminiscent of Edwards’s (1979) descrip-
tion of the simple-control paradigm that characterized small capitalist
firms in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
Selection.—The third dimension concerns the primary basis for se-
lecting employees. Some founders’ responses suggested that they con-
ceived of the firm as a bundle of tasks and sought employees to carry out
particular tasks effectively. Time and money tended to be the paramount
concerns here, so the focus was on selecting employees who could be
brought on board and up to speed as quickly and cheaply as possible. In
these cases, founders envisioned selecting employees having the skills and
experience needed to accomplish some immediate task(s). Other founders
focused less on immediate and well-defined tasks than on a series of
projects (often not yet even envisioned) through which employees would
move over time. Accordingly, they focused on long-term potential. Finally,
some founders focused primarily on values and cultural fit, emphasizing
how a prospective hire would connect with others in the organization.
Relationships among the three dimensions. These blueprints can be
classified into three types of attachment and selection and four types of
control, yielding possible combinations. However, the3# 3# 4p 36
observations cluster into a few cells (see Burton 2001), which we will refer
to as five basic model types for employment relations, summarized in
table 1.
The engineering model involves attachment through challenging work,
peer group control, and selection based on specific task abilities. This
model parallels standard descriptions of the default culture among high-
tech Silicon Valley start-ups (e.g., Saxenian 1994), and it is the modal
employment blueprint among founders of SPEC firms. The star model
refers to attachment based on challenging work, reliance on autonomy
and professional control, and selecting elite personnel based on long-term
potential. The commitment model entails reliance on emotional-familial
attachments of employees to the organization, selection based on cultural
fit, and peer group control. The bureaucracy model involves attachment
based on challenging work and/or opportunities for development, selecting
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TABLE 1
Five Basic Employment Model Types
Basic Model Type
Dimensions
Attachment Selection Coordination/Control
Star . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Work Potential Professional
Engineering . . . . . . . . Work Skills Peer/cultural
Commitment . . . . . . . Love Fit Peer/cultural
Bureaucracy . . . . . . . . Work Skills Formal
Autocracy . . . . . . . . . . Money Skills Direct
individuals based on their qualifications for a particular role, and for-
malized control (for further discussion of this model type, see Baron,
Hannan, and Burton [1999b], appendix). Finally, the autocracy model
refers to employment premised on monetary motivations, control and
coordination through close personal oversight, and selection of employees
to perform pre-specified tasks.
We refer to these five blueprints as the basic model types. We do so
not only because they are the most prevalent combinations observed
within this sample, but because they also display several other important
properties. First, each of these blueprints exhibits a high degree of co-
herence or internal consistency among the three dimensions, suggesting
that they complement one another to form an overarching system. For
instance, consider a founder intending to emphasize control and coordi-
nation through organizational norms and seeking emotional bonds to the
company itself (rather than attachment based on the specific work as-
signment), perhaps in order to create overarching goals among differen-
tiated subunits. Here there would be a clear technical complementarity
with selection mechanisms that screen for values and cultural fit, as is
found under the commitment model. Second, these types display cultural
resonance and salience within this population and its setting. When we
have described these archetypes to Silicon Valley employers, employees,
and other knowledgeable parties, they understand the distinctions and
frequently begin classifying organizations with which they have experi-
ence in these terms.
Furthermore, the five basic types reflect different logics of organizing
within other institutions that actors in this organizational field have ex-
perienced; indeed, the labels for the types are fairly evocative of the char-
acteristics. For instance, the star model—particularly prevalent among
firms developing medical technology or pursuing research6—resonates
6 Among SPEC firms in the medical technology or research sectors (including bio-
technology), 42.3% were founded along star model lines, compared to only 1.6% of
firms in other industry sectors.
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closely with the model that underlies academic science, from which many
of the founders and key scientific personnel sought for these start-ups are
recruited. The commitment model draws instead on familial imagery and
the revered legend of Hewlett–Packard within Silicon Valley. The engi-
neering model resonates with the socialization that engineers receive in
professional school and suits the Valley’s highly mobile labor force. The
bureaucratic model is readily familiar from encounters with bureaucracies
in numerous contexts. Finally, the austere, no-nonsense autocracy model
communicates a powerful and consistent message that employees certainly
have encountered elsewhere before: “You work [for me, the boss], you get
paid [by me]—nothing more, nothing less.” We make no claim that these
basic model types are generic, or even generalizable outside this popu-
lation of organizations. Rather, we simply claim that these basic model
types capture blueprints for organizing that have a systemic quality and
display cultural resonance within this setting.
A significant number of companies differed from one (and only one) of
the basic model types on only one dimension. We will refer to these as
near-model types. For instance, about 3% of founders envisioned basing
attachment on love, selecting based on fit, and utilizing direct control.
This combination represents a near-commitment blueprint: it differs from
the basic commitment model firm in terms of control (only), and differs
substantially (i.e., on two or more dimensions) from the other four model
types. Such an organization suggests an autocratic cult variant on the
commitment model. Finally, we will use the terms aberrant or nontype
to refer to all other blueprints—firms in which the blueprint either (1)
differs from two or more basic model types on one dimension (and does
not fall into any of the basic types) or (2) differs along two or more
dimensions from every basic model type.
Methodological concerns.—This effort to characterize the organiza-
tional blueprints of entrepreneurs raises a host of conceptual and meth-
odological issues (see Baron, Hannan, and Burton 1999b). Here we touch
briefly on several concerns. First, our coding effort and our conceptual-
ization of organizational blueprints sought to measure the premises of
founders and CEOs. Blueprints might or might not bear a relationship
to organizational reality (for some evidence that they do in this sample,
see Baron et al. 1996). In classifying firms on the three dimensions, we
took pains to rely not on what respondents claimed they were actually
doing, but instead on what they recounted about their underlying organ-
izational model or conception.
Second, founders might have selectively reconstructed the past. Al-
though we cannot definitively rule out retrospection bias, some previous
results provide reassurance on this score. For instance, Baron et al. (1999a)
reported that the founder’s initial organizational blueprint is strongly and
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systematically related to an objective, independent measure of present-
day managerial and administrative intensity—suggesting that the bur-
eaucratization process was path dependent—whereas the current CEO’s
blueprint was unrelated to present-day administrative intensity. If re-
spondents were selectively tailoring their stories to match or rationalize
reality, then the responses of present-day CEOs should do a better job of
predicting present-day organizational arrangements than do founders’
recollection of their organization-building premises at the start-up phase.
Furthermore, some founders acknowledged during interviews that their
original models were naı¨ve or ill conceived. Their ability and willingness
to be self-critical suggests that they were not simply reporting ex post a
self-serving conception tailored to actual developments. On the other
hand, given the retrospective nature of founders’ accounts and other lim-
itations of the available data, our findings and inferences regarding the
effect of changing organizational models should be treated as suggestive,
not definitive.
Third, we cannot tell for sure when employment models changed (if
they did), and hence causality could run in the other direction: firms
experiencing higher turnover might change their employment models in
an effort to stem that turnover. Though we cannot rule out this competing
account, several important pieces of evidence argue against it, as we
discuss below.
As noted above, previous research on the SPEC firms has documented
that founders’ initial organizational blueprints shaped not only the evo-
lution of human resource practices and the HR function, but numerous
other facets of organizational evolution as well. The fact that founders’
models predict how firms develop over time provides some evidence of
the validity of the typology of basic employment models. We can also
assess whether the taxonomy captures real and meaningful distinctions
in founders’ organization-building templates by examining whether model
change disrupts the enterprise, as manifested in increased turnover.
HYPOTHESES
Effects of Organizational Model and Model Change on Turnover
It is important to distinguish between two potentially competing effects
of changing the organizational model on turnover. The first concerns what
Barnett and Carroll (1995) call the process effects of change: the disruptive
and destabilizing effects of altering deeply embedded organizational prem-
ises. If our basic model types in fact capture distinctive systems or recipes
for organizing, then efforts to change the founder’s initial employment
model should be disruptive. We therefore predict
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Hypothesis 1.—The more that an organization’s blueprint or model
has changed from what the founder initially envisioned, the higher the
rate of employee turnover.7
Barnett and Carroll argue, however, that analysts can gain more precise
and informative results by also taking account of a second set of effects
associated with organizational change—which they term content ef-
fects—which reflect the potential improvement in consistency (and, pre-
sumably, a concomitant decline in labor force turnover) from abandoning
an initial model that was incoherent and relatively unfamiliar. (For re-
views of the evidence on these two types of effects of organizational
change, see Barnett and Carroll [1995] and Carroll and Hannan [2000],
chap. 16). In our context, this implies that the potentially disruptive effects
of model change might depend on an interaction between origins (the
particular blueprint initially espoused by the founder) and destinations
(the new blueprint). Altering deeply embedded organizational premises is
likely to be most disruptive for firms that began with a coherent blueprint
(i.e., one of the five basic model types). Changing the model should be
less disruptive for firms that began with an aberrant blueprint. In par-
ticular, for moves from a nontype blueprint to one of the five basic model
types, the disruptive effects of change might be more than offset by en-
hanced consistency of premises governing employment relations, serving
to dampen turnover. Conversely, moves from one aberrant model to an-
other presumably engender little or no improvement in consistency to
offset the disruptive effects of change, leading us to expect that such
transitions provoke particularly high turnover.
Hypothesis 1a.—Changing the employment model increases turnover
most in organizations that began with one of the basic employment models
and least in organizations that began with an aberrant (nontype) blueprint.
Hypothesis 1b.—The effect of model change on turnover is larger
(smaller) for transitions that increase (decrease) a firm’s distance from one
of the basic employment models.
Some transitions among basic model types are likely to be more dis-
ruptive than others. We expect that abandoning the commitment and star
models is particularly destabilizing, especially when the transition is to a
bureaucratic model. Firms founded along commitment or star lines are
more likely to bring in a nonfounder CEO and to do so sooner (Hannan
et al. 1996). Hannan et al. speculate that these two models most strongly
implicate the founders in implicit contracts with early employees: in star
firms, star employees are often recruited to the enterprise by a prior per-
sonal connection to the founder(s); in commitment firms, the founder
7 All hypotheses assume that all other relevant determinants of turnover are held
constant (i.e., ceteris paribus assumptions apply).
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represents the central figure in the clan. In contrast, the engineering model
seems to represent the Silicon Valley default (Saxenian 1994) and to have
an affinity with bureaucratic culture (Shenhav 1995), suggesting that the
engineering blueprint might be easier both to reach and to abandon (es-
pecially if it is being abandoned for bureaucracy) than other models.
Accordingly, we predict:
Hypothesis 1c.—Abandoning the commitment or star model is more
disruptive than abandoning the engineering model, especially for transi-
tions to the bureaucratic model.
Among companies that retained their employment blueprint over time,
it seems reasonable to expect turnover to be particularly low in firms that
adhered to a commitment model. Conversely, as firms age, grow, and
become more complex, retaining star or autocracy models might prove
increasingly contentious—in the former case, due to tension between the
early stars and the rest of the organization, with whom they are increas-
ingly interdependent; in the latter case, because autocratic control appears
increasingly capricious and untenable as enterprises become larger, more
complex, and more differentiated. Hence, we would expect to see higher
turnover among firms that have retained a star or autocracy model
throughout their existence.
We do not advance predictions about the main effect of founder’s em-
ployment model on turnover. Gross differences in turnover as a function
of founder’s employment model might reflect the fact that some blueprints
are inherently less stable (i.e., less likely to persist over time) than others.
As we shall see below, turnover rates differ significantly among founders’
employment models, even after we control for an extensive array of or-
ganizational and environmental characteristics. However, the pattern is
subtle and, in some ways, counterintuitive; it reflects differences in the
persistence of the various model types as well as their underlying turnover
propensities. Therefore, rather than offering specific hypotheses, we un-
ravel the issue empirically below. To capture both the process and content
effects of organizational change, we examine the effects of changing the
organizational blueprint per se, supplemented with more fine-grained
analyses of how turnover varies as a function of stability and change in
founder’s model (i.e., taking into account both the origin and destination
blueprint).
THE DISRUPTIVE NATURE OF TURNOVER
Ecological perspectives imply that the turnover occasioned by altering
the premises on which an organization was built should be disruptive. If
this disruption reflects changes in skills, values, working relationships,
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and routines associated with a change in the organizational blueprint,
there is a clear implication for the observed pattern of turnover:
Hypothesis 2.—The turnover associated with change in an organi-
zation’s employment model is concentrated disproportionately among
high-tenure employees.
Note that there is a plausible alternative hypothesis.8 A distinctive and
coherent blueprint helps organizations create and sustain a reputation in
the labor market (Baron and Kreps 1999, chap. 3). Employees who con-
sider joining a firm that has a history of espousing a particular model are
likely to have a good sense of what they will encounter. If that model
subsequently changes, however, it presumably takes some time before this
change gets recognized widely within the labor market, especially if the
new model lacks consistency and distinctiveness. Hence, employees who
join a firm following a change in its model might be more likely to be
mismatched to the organization and therefore to depart promptly. Ac-
cording to this argument, changing the model prompts higher turnover
among recently hired personnel who come to conclude that they do not
fit the organization. If this story has merit, then we would expect that
turnover in firms that have changed their employment models gets con-
centrated among a mismatched new guard, rather than among a disen-
chanted old guard.
Another implication of the ecological perspective is that employee turn-
over should adversely affect organizational performance (at least in the
short run), particularly in young, knowledge-intensive, technology com-
panies. To be sure, turnover can have beneficial organizational conse-
quences, including enhanced innovation and adaptability (Pfeffer 1983).
And numerous observers of Silicon Valley (e.g., Saxenian 1994) have em-
phasized the beneficial effects of abundant labor mobility in fostering
innovation and entrepreneurial opportunity. But the alleged benefits of
turnover usually pertain to the industry or regional level, rather than to
individual firms. Moreover, the assertion that turnover on balance proves
beneficial seems somewhat at odds with the lengths to which many Silicon
Valley start-up firms go in trying to bind employees (e.g., stock options,
noncompete agreements, extensive benefits) and the frequency with which
we heard senior executives in these companies fret about turnover as “a
problem.” Accordingly, we also predict that:
Hypothesis 3.—Employee turnover has a negative effect on organi-
zational performance.
8 We are indebted to Craig Olson for stimulating our thinking on this point.
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OTHER DETERMINANTS OF TURNOVER
Other factors must be controlled in assessing the net effect of change in
organizational blueprints on turnover. In particular, CEO succession
prompts change in start-up companies. Organizational researchers have
demonstrated that changes in top management regimes can have powerful
effects on employee turnover (Friedman and Saul 1991; Kesner and Dalton
1994; Virany, Tushman, and Romanelli 1992), although past studies have
focused almost exclusively on turnover among top management teams
within large corporations. CEO succession likely has broader effects on
employee turnover within the companies that we examine, in which the
CEO (and particularly the initial founder–CEO) typically is the architect
of strategy, the chief spokesperson of the organization’s culture, and often
the catalyst for recruiting key scientific, technical, marketing, and sales
personnel into the venture in the first place. Hence, the departure of the
organization’s leader likely disrupts goals, values, routines, social rela-
tionships, and implicit contracts regarding the nature of employment. Not
surprisingly, organizational models change more frequently among SPEC
companies that have changed CEOs,9 so it is important to ensure that
any observed effects of model change do not simply reflect CEO change.
Although these relatively small, young, high-technology companies
might be more dependent on their founders and leaders than other types
of organizations, there are ways in which founders can institutionalize
their conception of the organization’s employment model so that it per-
sists, even after they depart. In particular, we expect that the longer an
organization’s initial leadership regime has been in place, the lower the
subsequent rate of turnover. This prediction is relatively straightforward
for companies still led by the initial regime: the longer the regime has
been in place, the more likely it is to have institutionalized a distinctive
organizational blueprint and screened out employees who do not fit that
blueprint. But the duration of the initial regime might influence turnover
even after that regime has ended. This is because longer-lived founding
regimes will have been better able to establish and institutionalize a co-
herent organizational model and supporting culture that enables the en-
terprise to attract and retain employees who suit that setting.10
Our analyses hold constant the cumulative number of CEOs a firm has
9 Among firms in which a founder was still CEO, 64.3% were coded as not having
changed on any of the three dimensions of the employment blueprint; among firms
whose CEO in 1994–95 was not a founder, the corresponding figure was 23.6%.
10 In supplementary analyses, we examined whether any effects of CEO succession on
turnover depend on the tenure of the outgoing CEO and/or characteristics of the
incoming CEO, such as whether he/she was promoted from within and, if so, was a
member of the founding team. However, we did not detect any systematic interaction
effects.
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had at a given point in time. One might imagine that leadership changes
have cumulative disruptive effects, so that turnover increases with the
number of CEOs an organization has had over a given interval of time,
controlling for when the last succession event occurred. Alternatively,
organizations might become habituated to executive succession, so that
the first regime change produces considerably more disruption than do
subsequent ones.11 Given these competing predictions, we do not offer a
specific directional hypothesis.
We control for two key milestone events: procuring venture capital and
making an initial public offering (IPO) of stock. These events might have
opposing effects on employee turnover, insofar as they generally involve
an infusion of resources into the organization while also bringing about
significant changes in organizational arrangements, routines, and (in many
cases) leadership. In supplementary analyses, we also include controls for
industry, occupational composition, and the gender mix in the firm’s first
year of operations to capture variations in the mix of jobs and workers
across SPEC companies.
Organizational size, growth, and age also may influence labor force
turnover. Turnover is likely to be higher in rapidly growing firms for
various reasons: (1) rapid growth often strains an organization and its
members; (2) organizations that must scale up their workforce rapidly are
more likely to make hiring errors, resulting in short-lived appointments
that are reflected in high turnover; and (3) if organizational growth is
correlated with economic growth in Silicon Valley generally (e.g., semi-
conductor firms are expanding because the cyclical semiconductor in-
dustry has rebounded), firms might face more labor market competition
during periods of rapid growth.
As organizations mature, they systematize employment relations and
presumably become better informed about the needs and desires of their
employees. Consequently, it seems reasonable to expect that turnover rates
will decline with organizational age. Furthermore, older firms seem less
likely going forward to face the need for major changes in employment
relationships and employment levels (of the sort that would produce high
turnover) than firms that are still in their infancy. Nonetheless, we predict
that turnover actually increases with organizational age in our sample.
First, growing routinization and bureaucratization as firms age might
11 The same negative relationship between cumulative number of CEOs and turnover
could obtain if early generations of leaders confront more fundamental sources of
uncertainty that could influence strategy or if the actions of early leaders constrain
the options of subsequent leaders. For instance, it seems easier to imagine the first
CEO of a firm needing to completely reformulate the firm’s strategy or shrink the
firm’s workforce by 50% than it is to envision the fifth CEO of a firm facing those
same challenges.
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impede adaptation to rapidly changing environments (as suggested by
stories of senescence and obsolescence—see Hannan 1998) and encourage
employees to migrate to firms that appear better suited to current con-
ditions. Second, the relevant technical labor force has a renowned antip-
athy to rigid bureaucracy. Moreover, it is widely believed among Silicon
Valley’s labor force that superior financial rewards and technical chal-
lenges come from getting in on the ground floor of a new enterprise,
suggesting that employees might become more likely to depart as their
firm ages.
DATA, MEASURES, AND METHODS
Data
We sent a survey to the executive designated by the CEO as having
oversight of HR (sometimes, the CEO himself or herself). The survey
asked the respondent to provide the firm’s annual turnover rate for 1991,
1992, 1993, and 1994. (For firms that were visited in summer or fall of
1994, the survey asked about turnover annualized for the first six months
of 1994, rather than the entire year.) A few firms visited in 1995 provided
turnover data for the first half of 1995. The survey also requested infor-
mation on various facets of the company’s HR system and attributes of
its workforce, including the current tenure distribution and occupational
and gender composition at the end of the first year of operations and at
the time of the survey. Of the 173 firms in the study, 101 (59%) returned
surveys with usable turnover data. We found no evidence of bias asso-
ciated with the pattern of missing data resulting from some firms not
returning the HR survey (Baron et al. 1999b, appendix).
Because some independent variables vary over time, we constructed
multiple spells for each firm corresponding to the reporting periods for
which it provided turnover information (calendar years, except for in-
stances in which firms reported turnover for the first half of the year in
which they were interviewed). We use pooled cross-section time-series
techniques to analyze the data (see below). The data set we analyze con-
tains 327 spells for the 101 firms that provided usable turnover data on
the HR survey. Of the 101 companies, 8 provided usable information for
one turnover spell, 18 for two spells, 17 for three spells, and 58 for four
spells.
Measures
Our dependent variable is the square root of the firm’s annual turnover
rate. We use the square root transformation to normalize what is otherwise
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a skewed distribution (for a variable that can take on zero values) and
because we suspect that most factors that increase turnover (e.g., age,
size) do so at a diminishing rate.12
We measure leadership change with an indicator variable denoting
whether a CEO was appointed or left the firm during the spell.13 We also
include a measure of the firm’s cumulative number of CEOs as of the
start of a spell.14 We measure the tenure of the firm’s first leadership
regime as the tenure of the company’s first CEO in the firm, as of the
start of the spell.15 (This is a time-varying covariate because it increments
in value over time for firms that have only had one CEO.) By definition,
this measure is missing for firms that had yet to designate a CEO as of
the start of a spell. (Some Silicon Valley start-ups do not designate a CEO
12 The HR survey requested information on the “annual turnover rate” for specific
calendar years. (It was not feasible to gather data on turnover rates by occupation
within these companies.) We were concerned that respondents might have varied in
how they defined this rate. We followed up by telephone with a sample of respondents,
asking how they had defined the turnover rate in filling out the survey. Most respon-
dents apparently defined turnover as the fraction of employees present at the beginning
of the period who departed by the end of the period, and a number told us that this
is how turnover is generally construed by Silicon Valley companies. Variations in how
respondents defined turnover should add noise to the data, reducing the likelihood of
uncovering significant statistical relationships. Moreover, in supplementary analyses,
we estimated the effects of time-varying covariates on turnover in fixed-effects spec-
ifications that control for stable characteristics of each firm (including how it defined
turnover). The results were largely unchanged, further suggesting that our findings
are unlikely to reflect differences in how respondents defined the annual turnover rate.
13 Data on executive succession were obtained from a variety of sources, including
interviews with firm informants, business press articles, annual reports, other public
documents (e.g., 10K filings), and company web sites. When our data sources indicated
that one chief executive departed in a given month and another person began in that
role during the following month, we treated this as if there had been no interruption
between the two. Due to imprecision in dating the exact founding date of each company,
we treated a CEO as having served since the inception of the firm if, according to our
data sources, his/her tenure as CEO commenced within three months of the company’s
founding. (Otherwise, the data record for that company would indicate that it did not
have a CEO at the beginning of the spell in question.) In the same vein, because we
could not always time venture capital financings or transitions to public status precisely,
we treated a company as having had venture capital or being a publicly traded entity
as of the start of a given spell if our records indicated that it had received venture
capital or went public by the end of the first month within that spell.
14 The key contrast in the data was between firms being led by their first CEO vs. a
subsequent CEO; accordingly, we dichotomized this measure.
15 Notice that the measure captures how long the first CEO had been in the firm, not
how long he or she had been CEO. This reflects our belief that it is whether the first
CEO was part of the founding team and how much of the firm’s history he or she
witnessed that affects the ability to institutionalize an organizational blueprint that
employees will perceive as legitimate, even if the first CEO was not appointed to the
top job until some time after joining the company.
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until this is required by investors, the exigencies of going public, and the
like. This was the case for about 2.5% of the firm–spells in our sample).
Consequently, in supplementary analyses, we also created an alternative
measure of the duration of the firm’s first leadership regime: first-leader
tenure within the firm as of the start of a spell, for firms that have had
a CEO; or the organization’s age at the start of the spell, if the firm had
not yet appointed a CEO. We reasoned that the first leadership regime
for firms without a CEO involves some sort of shared power arrangement,
in place since the firm’s inception. The findings were unchanged when
we utilized this alternative measure (results available upon request). To
simplify the exposition, we report results only from analyses of spells for
firms that had had one or more CEOs as of the start of the spell. This
has the effect of reducing slightly the number of available cases, thereby
raising our burden in detecting significant effects.
We represent founders’ organizational models with binary variables
corresponding to the typology in table 1. Unless otherwise noted, near-
model types (i.e., firms that differed along only one of the three dimensions
from one and only one of the five basic types) are grouped with their
corresponding types. This potentially mutes some of the contrasts among
model categories, but it also increases the number of cases in several
categories, thereby providing more statistical power for detecting system-
atic differences. We measure the magnitude of change in the organiza-
tional model by the number of dimensions (0–3) that changed between
the founder’s blueprint and the blueprint coded from the responses of the
(then-current) CEO. We also report more fine-grained analyses that allow
the impact of stability or change in a firm’s model to vary as a function
of which particular model it started with and/or migrated to.
We control for how long (in years) the firm had received venture capital
financing and/or been publicly traded, as of the start of each spell. We
transform both variables by taking the square root, because we suspect
that the effect of getting venture capital and/or going public on turnover
declines sharply with duration, with the major effect capturing the dif-
ference between firms that had versus had not experienced these events.
We capture organizational growth by controlling for employment size
(in the square root metric) at the end of the year preceding each spell and
at the end of the firm’s first year of operations.16 Organizational age equals
years since founding, as of the start of each spell. Based on information
16 The former measure was obtained from secondary sources (corporate directories,
etc.), interpolated between intervals as necessary. Employment at the end of the first
year of operations was measured based on the HR survey provided by the company.
(For firms that did not provide an HR survey, this variable was imputed statistically
from the secondary-source data and other variables related to employment size.)
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provided by founders concerning the timing of various events, we defined
the founding date to be the earliest of three events: legal incorporation,
hiring the first employee, and start of “normal business operations.” In
supplementary analyses, we also included controls for time (a linear time
trend or dummy variables corresponding to the calendar year to which
each spell corresponded), but these controls were insignificant and did
not alter the pattern of results.
Finally, we represent industry with two dummy variables, one denoting
firms engaged in manufacturing and the other denoting firms engaged in
research; the omitted category represents firms in computer hardware or
software, telecommunications and networking, semiconductors, or med-
ical devices and biotechnology. (Other industry contrasts were not sig-
nificant.) In various supplementary analyses, we also controlled for the
distribution of the firm’s employees in the first year across various broad
occupational categories (e.g., scientific and engineering; administrative
and managerial; clerical; sales) and the proportion of the work force that
was female. These did not alter the basic pattern of effects of change in
organizational model on turnover; accordingly, their effects are not re-
ported here (results available on request).
Estimation
Our data structure is a pooled cross section and time series. The data are
unbalanced: the number of observations varies among firms. Recent or-
ganizational research typically models such data with fixed-effect esti-
mators, which analyze only the within-firm over-time variation. This
choice is unappealing in this context because some key independent var-
iables (e.g., founders’ organizational blueprints and whether the blueprint
changed) do not vary over time. Instead, we use robust estimators that
analyze both between-firm and within-firm variation. Specifically, we
use the method of generalized estimating equations (GEE) developed by
Liang and Zeger (1986; also see Zeger and Liang 1986). This approach
generalizes quasi-likelihood estimation to the panel context. Like quasi-
likelihood, GEE requires specification of only the first and second mo-
ments of the distribution of the outcome, rather than the full distribution
as is required for maximum likelihood. Under mild regularity conditions,
GEE estimators are consistent and asymptotically normal.
The setup we estimate is the following. The outcome is a firm’s turnover
rate (square root) in a given year. For the ith firm, we have ni observations,
y p (y , y , … , y ),i i1 i2 ini
and the vector of outcomes can be written as
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′( )yp y , y , … , y .l 2 m
The covariates vary over firms and (in some cases) over time for given
firms:
′( )Xp x , x , … , x , … , x ,11 12 K1 KI
( )x p x , x , … , x .ki ki1 ki2 kini
If we represent the disturbances as
( )u p u ,u , … , u ,i i1 i2 ini
then we can write the structural model to be estimated as
yp Xb u.
We expect that the disturbance process will exhibit autocorrelation of
the usual panel type: observations for the same firm will tend to be cor-
related due to permanent and gradually changing, unobserved firm prop-
erties. However, we assume that observations are uncorrelated for dif-
ferent firms. In particular, we assume that the covariance matrix of
disturbances has the following form:
A 0 . . 01 
0 A 0 . 02
′( )E uu pf . 0 . . . ,
. . . . 0 
0 . . 0 A I
where fis a scale parameter,
A p j R,i i
and the matrix R satisfies the properties of a correlation matrix. GEE
requires a specification of a working correlation matrix. The implemen-
tation we used—the XTGEE routine within version 6.0 of STATA
(StataCorp 1999)—allows a menu of choices for the working correlation
matrix. We experimented with several, including the classic exchangeable
correlation structure from the standard random-effects setup, as well as
first- and second-order serial autocorrelation. We found that models fit
best when we used a completely unstructured working correlation matrix,
in which each off-diagonal entry is unconstrained and estimated from the
data. That is, we used as a working correlation matrix:
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1 
r 112
Rp r r 1 ,13 23
r r r 1 14 24 34
r r r r 1 15 25 35 45
where the rows and columns correspond to the calendar years represented
in our data set (1991–95).
We conjectured that autocorrelation would decline over time and across
waves of panels, because the hazard of major shocks that would coun-
teract autocorrelation in the determinants of turnover is likely to increase
as firms grow older. Consistent with our conjecture, autocorrelation did
decline with the temporal distance between spells and across waves of
panels (e.g., there was stronger autocorrelation between 1991 and 1992
observations than between the 1991 and 1993 panels or between the 1992
and 1993 panels), and models permitting this error structure fit consid-
erably better than models that impose a more constrained error structure.
We report robust standard errors, using the so-called sandwich estimators
developed by Huber (1967) and White (1982).
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 2 summarizes the pattern of transitions from founder to CEO mod-
els. Among firms that we classified as having a particular model at found-
ing, the table reports the fraction that we classified as having each type
of organizational model in 1994-95, based on our interviews with CEOs.
Row (1) in the table reports results based on classifying the founder’s
model as aberrant unless it corresponded perfectly to one of the five basic
model types in table 1. Row (2) groups near-model-type firms (i.e., those
that differed in only one dimension from only one of the five basic types)
with their corresponding basic type category. The parenthesized results
in table 2 pertain to the entire sample of SPEC firms for which we had
the requisite information to code the founder’s and CEO’s organizational
model, whereas the results without parentheses are for the subset of firms
providing valid data on employee turnover (and thus used in our analyses).
Table 2 provides descriptive background, but it is substantively infor-
mative in several respects. The diagonal entries in table 2 reveal that the
commitment and bureaucratic models—which in many respects represent
polar extremes—are the most persistent over time (i.e., have the smallest
fraction of firms that transitioned to a different model). And, despite the
relatively frequent shifts in the sample toward bureaucracy, no firms
founded along commitment model lines made that transition. Table 2 also
portrays the engineering model as relatively compatible with other or-
TABLE 2
Stability and Change in Organizational Models
Founder Model
CEO Model
Aberrant Autocracy Commitment Star Engineering Bureaucracy N Firms
Aberrant:
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60.5 (64.6) 2.6 (1.5) 2.6 (4.6) 2.6 (1.5) 13.2 (13.8) 18.4 (13.8) 38 (65)
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50.0 (54.2) 3.3 (2.1) 3.3 (4.2) .0 (.0) 16.7 (18.8) 26.7 (20.8) 30 (48)
Autocracy:
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50.0 (50.0) 50.0 (50.0) .0 (.0) .0 (.0) .0 (.0) .0 (.0) 4 (6)
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33.3 (40.0) 33.3 (40.0) 16.7 (10.0) .0 (.0) .0 (.0) 16.7 (10.0) 6 (10)
Commitment:
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28.6 (36.4) .0 (.0) 57.1 (54.5) .0 (.0) 14.3 (9.1) .0 (.0) 7 (11)
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.7 (9.5) 8.3 (9.5) 58.3 (71.4) 8.3 (4.8) 8.3 (4.8) .0 (.0) 12 (21)
Star:
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.5 (38.5) .0 (.0) .0 (.0) 37.5 (46.2) 12.5 (7.7) 12.5 (7.7) 8 (13)
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33.3 (33.3) .0 (.0) .0 (.0) 44.4 (53.3) 11.1 (6.7) 11.1 (6.7) 9 (15)
Engineering:
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25.0 (22.0) .0 (2.0) .0 (.0) .0 (.0) 43.8 (52.0) 31.3 (24.0) 32 (50)
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25.0 (20.0) .0 (2.0) .0 (2.0) .0 (.0) 43.8 (52.0) 31.3 (24.0) 32 (50)
Bureaucracy:
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.0 (12.5) .0 (.0) .0 (.0) .0 (.0) 20.0 (25.0) 60.0 (62.5) 5 (8)
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0 (.0) .0 (.0) 20.0 (11.1) .0 (.0) 20.0 (22.2) 60.0 (66.7) 5 (9)
All firms:
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41.5 (43.1) 3.2 (3.3) 5.3 (5.9) 4.3 (4.6) 23.4 (25.5) 22.3 (17.6) 94 (153)
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31.9 (30.7) 4.3 (5.2) 10.6 (13.1) 5.3 (5.9) 23.4 (25.5) 24.5 (19.6) 94 (153)
Note.—Table shows row percentages for transition matrix from founder’s to CEO’s model. Row 1 results classify firms as “aberrant” that do not correspond
to one of the five basic model types; row 2 results group “near-model-type” firms (see text for explanation) into the corresponding basic-type category. Results
shown in parentheses are for all SPEC firms; other results are for the subset of firms providing valid data on employee turnover. Chi-square tests for row 1 of
each pair: ; ; ; ; ); for row 2, ; ; ; ; ).2 2 2 2x p 113.4 dfp 25 P ! .001 (x p 195.0 dfp 25 P ! .001 x p 99.0 dfp 25 P ! .001 (x p 211.8 dfp 25 P ! .001
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ganizational models: a relatively high fraction of firms founded along
engineering model lines transitioned to a bureaucratic model (and vice
versa), and the engineering model seems to be a destination that is reached
with some frequency by firms irrespective of their founding model (except
for firms founded as autocracies). As we shall see below (table 5), the
transitions that occur with relatively low (high) frequency in table 2 are
generally the transitions that occasion relatively more (less) employee turn-
over. In other words, firms seem less likely to have made the most “turn-
over-prone” transitions than to undertake the less turnover-prone ones.
This gives us some confidence that the model types capture distinct or-
ganizational blueprints and suggests that the architects and leaders of
firms are mindful of the disruptive consequences of changing organiza-
tional blueprints.
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for all 327 spells containing valid
turnover data. The annual turnover rate averages approximately 13%,
though there is obviously substantial variation. (Though not reported in
table 3, among the 93 firms with two or more turnover spells, 54.9% of
the variation in turnover is between firms; for the square root of turnover,
the corresponding figure is 62.6%.) Note that modest differences in turn-
over, if sustained over time, can have quite dramatic implications for
organizations. For instance, according to table 3, firms in the sample were
on average about 4.5 years old at the start of a spell.17 Consider the
cumulative effect of being one standard deviation above the sample mean
on turnover (26% vs. 13%). If annual turnover remained constant at 13%
for a cohort over time, then after four years, 57% of the original cohort
would remain; after six years, the fraction is 43%. In a firm experiencing
26% turnover, just under 30% of the original employees would still be
there after four years, and only 16% after six years. (The picture does not
change much if we incorporate more reasonable assumptions about turn-
over declining with tenure.) Such differences in the representation of the
old guard seem likely to have significant organizational implications.
A change in top leadership occurred during 11.6% of the spells. In
about 2.5% of the spells, firms had not yet appointed a CEO; for nearly
17 Note that the minimum organizational age reported in table 3 is –0.42%. For a few
cases (just under 4% of spells), the birth of the organization (based on our criteria for
defining age—see text) occurred sometime during the spell. To be treated as a valid
observation and included in our sample, a firm must have existed for more than half
the year to which the turnover data corresponded, and the company had to have
provided turnover information for the year in question. This was done to avoid cases
in which, for instance, a firm might have reported turnover data for 1991 but our
measure of organizational age indicated that the firm came into existence in November
or December of 1991, so the firm’s turnover report pertained to an extremely short
period and thus was error-prone.
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TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max N spells N firms
Turnover rate:
During annual spell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.23 10.00 12.94 .00 100.00 327 101
During annual spell (square root) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.16 3.16 1.80 .00 10.00 327 101
Employment:
Start of spell (FTEs, square root) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.39 6.32 6.53 .00 40.74 314 95
End of year 1 (FTEs, square root) . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.77 4.12 3.83 1.00 25.17 315 95
Duration of first leadership (years) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.67 3.00 2.66 .09 12.50 314 88
Duration of first CEO (years) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.77 3.00 2.64 .08 12.50 306 83
Change in CEO during spell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 .00 .00 1.00 327 101
No CEO at start of spell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .02 .00 .00 1.00 327 101
2 CEOs as of start of spell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 .00 .00 1.00 327 101
Cumulative N of CEOs as of start of spell . . . . . . 1.36 1.00 .84 .00 6.00 327 101
Duration of VC funding (years, square root) . . . . 1.15 1.22 1.04 .00 3.30 327 101
Duration of public status (years, square root) . . . .23 .00 .56 .00 2.77 327 101
Age at start of spell (years) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.50 4.25 2.99 .42 13.91 327 101
Founder’s model:*
Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 .00 .00 1.00 302 93
Star . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 .00 .00 1.00 302 93
Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34 .00 .00 1.00 302 93
Autocracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .07 .00 .00 1.00 302 93
Hybrid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 .00 .00 1.00 302 93
Bureaucracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .06 .00 .00 1.00 302 93
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CEO’s vs. founder’s model:
N dimensions changed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .84 1.00 .87 .00 3.00 302 93
Industry:
Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .02 .00 .00 1.00 327 101
Manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .04 .00 .00 1.00 327 101
Computer hardware/software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44 .00 .00 1.00 327 101
Telecommunications/networking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 .00 .00 1.00 327 101
Medical devices or biotech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18 .00 .00 1.00 327 101
Semiconductors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 .00 .00 1.00 327 101
Proportion employees, end of year 1, in:
Science/engineering roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 .42 .23 .00 .78 263 77
Sales roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .08 .05 .10 .00 .43 259 76
Clerical roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .04 .00 .06 .00 .29 259 76
Administrative/senior management roles . . . . . . .40 .33 .23 .09 1.00 260 76
Proportion female, end of year 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24 .22 .15 .00 .64 265 78
Note.— SDs are not shown for binary variables.
* “Near-type” firms grouped with corresponding “pure type” firms in each category (see text for explanation).
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a quarter of the spells, the firm had already experienced two or more
CEOs as of the start of the spell.
Among founders, the engineering model was the most prevalent (34%).
We coded roughly 7% of the founders as having an autocratic model,
13% as commitment, 11% as star, and just under 6% as bureaucratic.18
Thirty percent of founders gave responses that did not fit into any basic
model type (or one of the near-types); we coded their blueprints as aberrant
or nontype. The typical firm in our sample experienced change in its
organizational model along one dimension, based on our classification of
the blueprints associated with CEOs at the time of our interviews versus
the models envisioned by founders. (For 44.1% of the firms and 42.4%
of the spells, the founder and CEO models were identical on all three
dimensions.) Not surprisingly, model changes were more frequent and
extensive in firms that had also changed leadership. Among companies
with valid employee turnover data, 44% were still led by a founder in
1994–95; of those, 57% were coded as not having changed the blueprint
on any dimension and only 12% had changed on two or more dimensions.
Among companies with a nonfounder CEO by 1994–95, only 23% had
not changed the model on any of the three dimensions, whereas 40%
changed on two or more dimensions.
RESULTS
Effects of Organizational Model and Change in Model on Turnover
Table 4 reports results from multivariate analyses predicting the square
root of turnover for each firm-year spell. In a simple bivariate regression
(not shown in table 4), the gross effect of blueprint change (number of
dimensions that differed between the founder’s and CEO’s blueprints) is
0.660 . Thus, relative to firms with stable employment(zp 5.084, P ! .001)
blueprints, a firm in which the blueprint changed on all three dimensions
is predicted to have a turnover rate that is points2(3# .660) p 3.92
higher.19 This strong positive effect persists after controlling for other
determinants of turnover. Model 1 in table 4, for instance, adds dummy
variables depicting the founder’s blueprint (with bureaucracy as the omit-
ted category). Unexpectedly, firms founded on a bureaucracy model have
lower turnover rates than firms founded on different blueprints, and that
18 These percentages are based on combining “near-type” cases with their model-type
counterparts. For “basic model type” firms alone, autocracy is 4.3%, commitment is
6.3%; star is 9.3%; engineering is 33.8%, and bureaucracy is 5.6%.
19 This bivariate regression (based on 302 observations, 93 firms) has a constant of
2.594 ; scale perameter p 2.863; Wald ( ,2(zp 14.440, P ! .001) x p 25.85 dfp 1 P !
)..001
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effect persists in model 2, which controls for a variety of organizational
characteristics.
Of course, the effects of founders’ models might reflect differences
among the blueprints in their persistence and in the types of transitions
they will likely experience, which are not captured simply by the number
of dimensions that changed. As a first means of examining that possibility,
model 3 adds dummy variables depicting the CEO’s blueprint (with bu-
reaucracy as the omitted category). The main contrast among CEO blue-
prints is between autocracy, which exhibits the highest turnover rate net
of other controls, and the commitment model, which displays the lowest.
Accordingly, model 4 in table 4 presents the same specification with the
commitment blueprint as the reference category for founder’s and CEO’s
organizational model.20 Model 4 reveals that firms whose CEOs’ blue-
prints were autocracy or bureaucracy had significantly higher turnover
than otherwise comparable companies whose CEOs had a commitment
model. According to model 3, firms whose CEO had a bureaucratic model
also display significantly higher turnover than firms whose CEO model
was classified as star.
It is important to acknowledge the causal ambiguity involved in relating
CEO model and change in the model to turnover. Because we cannot
date when a firm’s model changed (if it did), turnover might be the cause,
not a consequence, of the CEO’s present-day model. We return to this
issue below and present some results that provide reassurance against
this possibility.
Models 3 and 4 of table 4 suggest that the effects of stability and change
in organizational blueprints depend substantially on the specific blue-
print(s) involved. For instance, relative to a firm that retained a bureau-
cratic model (the reference category in model 3), a stable autocracy is
predicted to have experienced a turnover rate that is (0.365
points higher. Or consider two firms whose models changed21.459) p 3.33
on two dimensions: firm A changed from engineering to commitment; and
firm B shifted from star to bureaucracy. Relative to firms with a stable
bureaucracy blueprint (the reference category in model 3), annual turnover
is predicted to be only 0.90 higher in firm A, compared to 7.00 higher in
firm B.21 When compared to firms with a stable commitment blueprint
20 Results for model 1 are comparable when reestimated on the same 271 cases as
models 2–4 in table 4.
21 For the star to bureaucracy transition, e.g., the predicted effect in model 3 is the
main effect of a star founder’s model (1.600), plus the main effect of a bureaucracy
CEO’s model (0), plus the effect of changing the model on two dimensions (2#
), for an overall effect of 2.646 in the square root metric or 7.00 on the turnover0.523
rate.
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TABLE 4
Turnover Rates: GEE Estimates of Pooled Cross-Section, Time-Series Variation
Variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
b z prob 1 d z d b z prob 1 d z d b z prob 1 d z d b z prob 1 d z d
Employment:
Start of spell (square
root) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .027 .864 .387 .035 1.100 .271 .035 1.100 .271
End of year 1 (square
root) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .051 1.347 .178 .036 .984 .325 .036 .984 .325
Duration of first CEO
(years) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .131 1.421 .155 .106 1.381 .167 .106 1.381 .167
Change in CEO during
spell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .222 .970 .332 .376 1.507 .132 .376 1.507 .132
2 CEOs as of start of
spell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .664 1.886 .059 .410 1.201 .230 .410 1.201 .230
Duration of VC funding
(years, square root) . . . . . .289 1.965 .049 .135 .968 .333 .135 .968 .333
Duration of public status
(years, square root) . . . . . .544 2.475 .013 .584 2.829 .005 .584 2.829 .005
Age at start of spell
(years) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .175 2.456 .014 .213 3.715 .000 .213 3.715 .000
Founder’s model:
Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.153 2.530 .011 1.190 2.440 .015 1.419 3.470 .001
Star . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .887 1.607 .108 1.294 2.711 .007 1.600 3.094 .002 .181 .421 .674
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Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.071 2.419 .016 1.047 2.654 .008 1.007 2.888 .004 .412 1.097 .272
Autocracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.173 1.966 .049 .905 1.333 .183 .365 .809 .418 1.054 2.597 .009
Aberrant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .781 1.809 .070 .885 2.126 .034 .889 2.271 .023 .530 1.866 .062
Bureaucracy . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.419 3.470 .001
CEO’s model:
Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.104 2.937 .003
Star . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .969 2.153 .031 .135 .282 .778
Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . .641 1.587 .113 .463 1.033 .302
Autocracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.459 3.739 .000 2.564 5.538 .000
Aberrant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .646 1.907 .057 .458 1.378 .168
Bureaucracy . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.104 2.937 .003
CEO’s vs. founder’s
model:
N dimensions changed . . . .648 4.784 .000 .644 4.067 .000 .523 3.730 .000 .523 3.730 .000
Industry:
Manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . .686 1.547 .122 .731 1.773 .076 .731 1.773 .076
Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.169 3.362 .001 1.105 3.356 .001 1.105 3.356 .001
Constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.698 4.575 .000 1.321 2.911 .004 1.569 3.833 .000 1.569 3.833 .000
N observations . . . . . . . . . . . . 302 271 271 271
N firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 85 85 85
Wald x2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39.36* 214.81* 462.96* 462.96*
df . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 16 21 21
Scale parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 2.867 2.472 2.218 2.218
* P ! .001.
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(the reference category in model 4), firm B is predicted to have an annual
turnover rate that is 5.43 higher, whereas firm A’s is only 1.51 higher.
Changing the Organizational Model: A Closer Look
The additive specification in table 4 potentially masks interactive effects
of origins and destinations in determining the disruptive effects of chang-
ing the organizational blueprint. To differentiate between the process and
content effects of organizational change, table 5 provides a finer-grained
portrait of how turnover varies as a function of stability and change in
founders’ employment blueprints. It reports estimates of specifications
that incorporate the same set of covariates as in model 2 of table 4, but
we replace the covariates representing founders’ blueprints and the num-
ber of dimensions that changed with a vector of dummy variables rep-
resenting specific combinations of founder and CEO blueprints. The par-
ticular combinations of origin and destination states incorporated in table
5 capture the main contrasts that we thought interesting (how close to
one of the five basic model types; distance between origin and destination
model; and so forth) and the main transitions observed in our data. (For
several transitions of particular substantive interest, the number of cases
was very small, but we have nonetheless reported the detailed results.)
The coefficients in table 5 represent predicted differences in turnover
(square-root metric) between firms that experienced a given transition and
two different reference categories: stable bureaucracies (the first set of
coefficients in table 5); or all firms that did not change their employment
blueprint (the second set of coefficients). Table 6 reports significance tests
on contrasts between specific coefficients (rows) in table 5, rather than
contrasts vis-a`-vis the reference categories.
Table 5 suggests two basic conclusions. First, abandoning a basic model
type was generally associated with higher turnover, in support of hy-
pothesis 1a (but see below). Consistent with hypothesis 1c, the disruptive
effect of abandoning a basic model type in favor of an aberrant blueprint
seems especially large for firms founded along commitment or star lines
(see comparison in table 6 between rows 7 and 8).22 Second, consistent
with hypothesis 1b, changing to a basic model type was less disruptive
than moving to an aberrant blueprint. For instance, among firms that
abandoned the commitment or star model, those migrating to the engi-
neering model had somewhat lower turnover than those adopting an
22 Even moving to the engineering model (a model that seems robust and flexible) from
the commitment or star model seems slightly more disruptive than migrating to the
engineering blueprint from any other pure model (cf. rows 12 and 13), though table 6
reveals that the contrast is not significant ( ).Pp .15
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aberrant blueprint (see comparison in table 6 between rows 7 and 12;
, two-tailed).23Pp .097
The bureaucracy and autocracy models do not fit this pattern, however.
Generally, moving to either of them increased turnover, whereas aban-
doning either of them reduced turnover. Moving from any other basic
model to bureaucracy increased turnover considerably, though the ap-
parent dislocation was considerably smaller among firms that migrated
to bureaucracy from the engineering model (cf. rows 10 and 11), consistent
with the claimed compatibility between engineering culture and bureau-
cratic culture. This result illustrates that origins and destinations matter:
movement to bureaucracy from either the engineering model or an ab-
errant blueprint produced significantly less turnover than did
abandonment of another basic model (especially the star type) for bu-
reaucracy (row 11). Similarly, in one case abandoning a basic model seems
to have reduced turnover: movement from bureaucracy to engineering
(row 13).
These findings suggest that, in at least some cases, the disruptive effects
associated with altering an organization’s employment model are more
than offset by an increase in the attractiveness of the new model. In short,
the content of organizational changes affects how disruptive they are.
Dismantling the commitment and star models apparently was most de-
stabilizing, whereas any disruptive effects associated with dismantling
bureaucracy seem to have been more than offset by favorable responses
to the change, resulting in lower turnover. Conversely, in shifts to bu-
reaucracy or autocracy, the virtues of a clear and consistent model as a
destination state were offset considerably by employees’ apparent strong
dislike for these particular models.
Another result in table 5 suggests that the basic model types represent
relatively desirable origin and destination states, in terms of minimizing
labor turnover: companies that replaced one aberrant or nontype blueprint
with another experienced especially high turnover (row 9). Only firms that
retained or adopted autocracy or that migrated to bureaucracy from an-
other basic model other than engineering had higher predicted turnover
levels (cf. rows 14, 15, 15a, and 15b).
In other words, if a founder adopted an aberrant HR model, then
changing to another aberrant model made the organization especially
vulnerable to turnover. The contrasts among these effects are not highly
significant, however, for several reasons. First, the transition from an
23 All firms that migrated to bureaucracy from a model type other than engineering
were founded along star-model lines (see row 11). This transition was characterized
by particularly high turnover, because abandoning the star model and migrating to
bureaucracy both seem to be destabilizing for technology companies.
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TABLE 5
Effects on Turnover of Stability and Change in Founder’s Employment Models
Reference Category
Row (Founder’s Model) ⇒ (CEO’s Model) N spells N firms
Stable Bureaucracy All Stable Firms
Coefficient z prob 1 d z d Coefficient z prob 1 d z d
1 . . . . . . Stable autocracy 4 2 2.151 2.571 .010
2 . . . . . . Stable commitment 11 4 .630 .826 .409
3 . . . . . . Stable star 10 3 1.053 2.108 .035
4 . . . . . . Stable engineering 36 10 .463 .826 .409
5 . . . . . . Stable near-type model* 12 3 .232 .398 .691
6 . . . . . . Stable aberrant (nontype) model 27 9 .202 .444 .657
7 . . . . . . (Commitment or star) ⇒ aberrant 14 5 2.061 3.828 .000 1.196 2.903 .004
8 . . . . . . (Basic model other than commitment or
star) ⇒ aberrant 33 10 .943 1.501 .133 .302 .632 .527
9 . . . . . . (Aberrant or near-type) ⇒ (different aber-
rant or near-type) 30 8 2.077 3.094 .002 1.198 2.114 .034
10 . . . . (Engineering or aberrant) ⇒ bureaucracy 50 16 1.345 2.971 .003 .651 1.740 .082
11 . . . . (Basic model other than engineering) ⇒
bureaucracy‡ 3 1 2.551 5.260 .000 1.739 4.516 .000
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12 . . . . (Commitment or star) ⇒ (different basic
model other than bureaucracy)† 3 2 .464 .486 .627 .304 .354 .723
13 . . . . (Basic model other than commitment or
star) ⇒ (different basic model other than
bureaucracy)†§ 3 1 .788 2.155 .031 1.480 5.868 .000
14 . . . . (Aberrant or near-type) ⇒ (commitment or
star) 8 2 .944 1.442 .149 .286 .478 .632
15 . . . . (Aberrant or near-type) ⇒ (basic model
other than commitment or star) 18 6 1.550 2.460 .014 .975 1.910 .056
15a . . . (Aberrant or near-type) ⇒ engineering 14 5 1.160 1.879 .060 .694 1.244 .214
15b . . . (Aberrant or near-type) ⇒ autocracy 4 1 3.004 5.902 .000 2.178 5.037 .000
Note.—Predicted effects on turnover (square root) from model controlling for same covariates as in model 2 of table 4. Results pertaining to rows 15a and 15b
are based on a supplementary specification replacing transition in row 15 with transitions shown in rows 15a and 15b; all other results are from a specification
including the contrasts in rows 1–15.
* All cases of stable near-type models are near-commitment firms.
‡ All transitions originated from star model
† All transitions involve move to engineering model
§ All transitions originated from bureaucratic model
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TABLE 6
Additional Contrasts among Coefficients in Table 5
Row Contrasts Coefficient z prob 1 d z d
7 versus (2, 3) . . . . . . . 1.244 2.161 .031
7 versus 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.118 1.930 .054
7 versus 12 . . . . . . . . . . 1.598 1.659 .097
9 versus (5, 6) . . . . . . . 2.183 3.888 .000
9 versus 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.134 1.771 .077
9 versus 14 . . . . . . . . . . 1.134 1.583 .114
9 versus 15 . . . . . . . . . . .528 .766 .444
9 versus 15a . . . . . . . . . .918 1.279 .201
9 versus 15b . . . . . . . . . .925 1.698 .090
10 versus (4, 5, 6) . . . 1.114 2.577 .010
10 versus 11 . . . . . . . . . 1.205 2.774 .006
10 versus 13 . . . . . . . . . 2.134 6.514 .000
12 versus 13 . . . . . . . . . 1.252 1.433 .152
14 versus (5, 6) . . . . . . 1.031 1.847 .065
14 versus 15 . . . . . . . . . .606 .909 .363
14 versus 15b . . . . . . . 2.073 3.495 .000
15a versus 15b . . . . . . 1.843 2.718 .007
15 versus (5, 6) . . . . . . 1.629 3.432 .001
aberrant blueprint to one of the five basic models compounds two op-
posing effects—the disruptive effects of altering the employment model,
and the (presumably) beneficial effect of adopting a consistent model.
Second, the benefit associated with shifting to a basic model type depends
on the underlying attractiveness of that model. For instance, relative to
firms that retained an aberrant blueprint, companies that shifted to one
of the basic types generally experienced higher turnover, consistent with
the notion that changing the premises governing employment relations
disrupts an organization’s equilibrium.
The magnitude of the effect of change depends significantly on the
destination (the new blueprint). Consider several examples. For transitions
to the commitment or star blueprint from an aberrant model (which were
few in number), predicted turnover was only modestly higher (1.031) than
among firms that stayed with a particular aberrant blueprint (zp
; ). Moving to the engineering model from a nontype blue-1.847 Pp .065
print occasioned somewhat higher turnover, significantly more than
among firms that retained a particular aberrant blueprint (if row 15a in
table 5 is contrasted against rows 5 and 6, ; ;bp 1.300 zp 2.704 Pp
; supplementary analyses not shown in table 6). The transition from.007
an aberrant model to bureaucracy also produced significantly higher turn-
over than occurred among companies that retained their founder’s ab-
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errant blueprint.24 Migrating from an aberrant form to autocracy, although
quite rare, seems to have been even more disruptive; firms making this
transition experienced significantly higher turnover than companies that
retained an aberrant blueprint ( ; ; ; supple-bp 3.193 zp 6.389 P ! .001
mentary analyses not reported in table 6), and even somewhat higher than
in companies that cycled from one aberrant model to another (see contrast
between rows 9 and 15b in table 6).
In short, model consistency and cultural resonance are not virtues in-
dependent of the model’s content. Rather, the effect of abandoning or
moving to one of the five basic models seems to depend quite a bit on
the specific model. The commitment and star models appear to be par-
ticularly risky to dismantle and less contentious to adopt. In contrast,
moving from bureaucracy and autocracy entails little disruption, whereas
moving toward these models seems especially unsettling.
The fine-grained analyses in tables 5 and 6 cast light on the differences
in turnover rates as a function of founder’s employment model that were
reported in table 4. Among firms that retained their original employment
blueprints, the only model types with significantly higher turnover than
bureaucracy were autocracy and star. According to table 5, autoc-
racy—whether adopted at the firm’s inception or subsequently (cf. rows
1 and 15b)—fosters high levels of employee turnover. This is hardly sur-
prising, given the considerable education, experience, and professionalism
among Silicon Valley’s labor force; the intense competition among em-
ployers for key personnel; and employees’ high expectations for autonomy
and self-actualization at work. The star model is widely perceived in
Silicon Valley as turnover-prone, due to perceived inequities it can foster,
the high mobility of scientific and technical stars to whom the model is
targeted, and the tendency of star-oriented firms to rely more on stock
options (which either stay underwater or else vest and are exercised, in
either case making the firm vulnerable to turnover).
Other differences in turnover rates as a function of the founder’s model
are not significant (in table 5) after controlling for the specific transitions
that firms experienced. Although turnover appeared (in table 4) to be
lower in firms founded along bureaucratic lines than in companies
founded on commitment, engineering, or hybrid models, tables 5 and 6
reveal that this is simply because the latter firms were more likely to
change their employment models—which on its own is destabilizing—and
24 In supplementary analyses, we subdivided row 10 into firms that transitioned to
bureaucracy from the engineering model versus from an aberrant (nontype) blueprint.
Turnover within the latter group was significantly higher than among firms with a
stable near-type or nontype blueprint ( ; ; ).bp 1.735 zp 2.899 Pp .004
American Journal of Sociology
996
to make the kinds of changes that foster higher turnover (i.e., toward
bureaucracy, autocracy, or an aberrant blueprint).
Yet table 5 indicates that no other employment model, retained over
time, displays significantly lower turnover than bureaucracy. We find this
result somewhat surprising in light of the apparent low regard with which
Silicon Valley employees view bureaucracy, as evidenced by the reductions
(increases) in turnover that seem to accompany firms’ abandoning (em-
bracing) a bureaucratic model (see rows 10, 11 and 13 in table 5). We
speculate that firms founded along bureaucratic lines might have antic-
ipated long-term growth and hired employees better prepared to handle
the transition to a more mature organization, whereas that transition
requires more “churning” of personnel in firms built on other models.25
(This is especially plausible to the extent that founders who embraced a
bureaucratic model had prior exposure to larger, well-established tech-
nology companies.) Some evidence consistent with this speculation comes
from the summary notes provided by a member of our research team
after interviewing a founder of one of the firms we coded as adhering to
a stable bureaucratic model. That founder had previously worked in one
of Silicon Valley’s largest and most prominent companies:
During her tenure, Z (one of the founders) has put in place systems and
controls that would be appropriate for a far larger company. Z has prepared
for the growth (little so far) that the company anticipates and she points
out that some of the company’s systems have yet to be fully utilized. The
firm under Z seems to be employee friendly. Z has a reputation for great
relations with her employees—or her “people,” as she’s been known to call
them—a fact that is borne out in the firm’s low turnover. She mentioned
two former employers (large, well-established technology companies) as in-
fluences with regard to organizational design. . . . CEO Z says she is the
person most responsible for HR at the company. HR at the firm is part of
strategic planning. When the company reaches 50 employees . . . a full-
time HR specialist will be hired. Indeed, Z knew exactly where in her file
cabinet to find the company’s employee handbook, developed in the com-
pany’s first year as Z’s first task as CEO. . . . In addition to the employee
handbook, she also instituted in the first year written performance evalu-
ations, nondisclosure agreements (NDAs), and instituted regular company-
wide meetings. (ID #141)
Another company that we classified as a stable bureaucracy seems to
fit a similar pattern—planning in advance for rapid growth by a founder
25 Precisely because bureaucracies are rather atypical within Silicon Valley, it is also
possible that firms founded along such lines transmit clearer and more accurate pre-
employment expectations for individuals joining the firm, relative to organizations
built on other models (particularly the commitment, star, and autocracy models), re-
sulting in higher posthiring attrition in the latter.
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with prior work experience in large, well-established technology com-
panies. This firm’s founder-CEO, a Ph.D. scientist who had worked pre-
viously in several large electronics, semiconductor, and defense companies,
anticipated the explosive growth in portable computers and in “smart
devices” (digital cameras, mobile phones, personal digital assistants) and
hoped to compete against Intel and Advanced Micro Devices in producing
flash memory storage devices. He sought to capture early mover advan-
tage by developing technology, key supplier and customer partnerships,
and organizational capability in advance of a market that was only just
emerging when the company was launched:
Founder: The catalyst for starting the company was that I believed that
there was going to be a need in the marketplace for the kind of products
that I had in mind several years after we were going to start a company.
. . . I felt I had a solution to a problem that was not yet evident as a problem.
. . .
Interviewer: (Did you have) a model or a blueprint for organizing the com-
pany at the beginning, whether from your past experience or from other
companies that you admired?
Founder: Yeah, it was basically, the first five years we would be a functional
organization, we would have VP’s for the various functions, no separate
divisions . . . , and have very good executive staff, hire a good CFO, a good
VP of engineering, VP of technology, VP of operations, traditional structure.
And I did not expect that (to) change in the first five years. I did not look
beyond the first five years. (ID #19)26
In sum, differences in turnover across founder models for the most part
reflect differences in the vulnerabilities of the particular models to sub-
sequent change and the dislocating effects of such changes. More broadly,
the results in tables 5 and 6 provide some indirect validation of our
typology of employment models. For instance, the high turnover char-
acteristic of firms that moved between aberrant blueprints suggests that
consistency of the organization’s employment model does indeed reduce
turnover. Moreover, transitions among particular origin and destination
models vary in sensible and predictable ways in affecting turnover (e.g.,
the dislocating effects of abandoning the commitment or star model and
of migrating toward bureaucracy or autocracy). Altering the employment
blueprint generally destabilizes organizations, especially when the blue-
print is relatively coherent. However, the content of the changes can
attenuate or exacerbate the process effect (the tendency for changing the
employment model to foster turnover).
26 Interestingly, when asked whether he had any specific company in mind as an
organizational model, the founder mentioned Intel, the largest firm in the industry.
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OTHER DETERMINANTS OF TURNOVER RATES
We briefly summarize the effects of other variables on firms’ turnover
rates in table 4. We find no net effect of change in CEO during a spell
on turnover. Interestingly, the gross effect (not shown in table 4) is sizable
and statistically significant ( ; ; ), but it be-bp 0.687 zp 2.539 Pp 0.011
comes insignificant once we control for change in the founder’s organi-
zational model.27 In other words, executive succession is associated with
turnover primarily because it is associated with model change. The fact
that the (time-varying) effect of executive succession is mediated by the
(time-invariant) effect of the number of model dimensions that changed
is substantively important. It gives us some confidence that change in the
blueprint operates as a cause, rather than as a consequence or correlate,
of turnover, even though we cannot be certain that all changes in blue-
prints preceded the turnover spells they are supposed to predict.28
We find only weak evidence of the hypothesized imprinting effect of
the organization’s first CEO. Controlling for organizational age, the more
of the firm’s history that was “presided over” by the first CEO, the lower
the subsequent turnover.29 However, this effect is moderated somewhat
and becomes statistically insignificant when other variables (specifically,
blueprint change) are controlled for.
According to model 2 of table 4, firms led by their second or subsequent
CEO experienced slightly lower turnover.30 However, this effect tends to
be pronounced only in specifications that also control for model change.
27 In a specification with CEO change (time-varying) and number of dimensions of
model change (time-invariant) as regressors, the effect of CEO change is 0.280 (zp
; ), whereas the effect of model change remains strong and significant1.494 Pp .135
( ; ; ).bp 0.643 zp 4.931 P ! .001
28 We also find a modest positive effect of changing the CEO on turnover in a standard
“fixed effects” model that controls entirely for between-firm variation in turnover and
includes only time-varying independent variables (results available on request). How-
ever, the size and significance of the effects are reduced considerably if a time-varying
measure of the cumulative number of CEOs in the firm is also added to the specification,
which has a significant negative effect on turnover in the fixed-effects model.
29 In a specification with just those two covariates, first CEO duration has a strong
negative effect on turnover ( ; ; ).bp0.186 zp2.345 Pp .019
30 In supplementary analyses that included spells for firms that had not yet designated
a CEO, we also found that companies experienced significantly lower turnover before
appointing their first CEO (relative to the omitted category, first CEO), even controlling
for organizational age (results available on request). We suspect that appointing a CEO
after a firm has functioned for some time without one destabilizes organizations for
two reasons: (1) it signals a move to a more business-like and hierarchical approach,
which often conflicts with the original vision of the founders; and (2) designating one
of the founders (or an outsider) as CEO after a period of collective control often causes
the remaining founders to feel disenfranchised and to depart, sometimes taking other
employees with them.
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This is because firms with a second or subsequent CEO are significantly
more likely to have experienced a model change, resulting in higher turn-
over; net of that tendency, however, such firms actually display somewhat
lower turnover. In other words, if we compare two firms that both altered
their original blueprint dramatically, the estimates of model 2 of table 4
imply that a firm still being run by its first CEO will have slightly higher
turnover than one in which the initial CEO has been replaced. We spec-
ulate that this result reflects the nature of implicit contracts. Founders
generally establish the implicit contracts with employees that are embed-
ded in the organizational blueprint; hence, it might be more contentious
for a founder-CEO to alter that blueprint and to remain at the helm, as
a continuing reminder to employees of how the enterprise has strayed
from its initial model, than it is for a newcomer CEO.31
Turnover increases with the length of time since a firm first received
venture capital. Venture capitalists (VCs) often help young organizations
formalize and fill key managerial and technical roles (Baron et al. 1999b),
especially as their relationship with the firm develops over time, because:
(1) they often maintain an initial hands-off approach; (2) if the enterprise
is proceeding on a path towards going public, VCs want to ensure that
the firm possesses the management capability and organizational routines
to handle this transition; and (3) if the firm is doing poorly, VCs will
frequently insist on changes in management and/or organizational routines
(using their board positions to bring this about). The effect of venture
capital in model 2 of table 4 might capture turnover that is induced when
VCs facilitate bureaucratization of firms and the replacement of early
employees.32 Turnover appears to decrease somewhat the longer a firm
has been public. This result is consistent with qualitative observations
from our interviews about disruptive effects that accompany the initial
public offering (IPO). Respondents noted that going public can disrupt
organizations in a variety of ways—for instance, requiring new sorts of
skills (e.g., financial reporting, public and investor relations) not previously
represented among employees, which might require both adding new
31 Consistent with that conjecture, adding an interaction term between the cumulative
number of CEOs and the number of dimensions that changed in the blueprint to model
2 of table 4 produces a negative effect that approaches statistical significance (bp
; ; , two-tailed), and the main effect for number of CEOs0.169 zp1.634 Pp .102
is no longer significant. Thus, turnover associated with changing the model is greatest
for companies still being led by their first CEO at the beginning of a spell.
32 Consistent with that interpretation, note that the effect of venture capital on turnover
becomes insignificant after controlling for the CEO’s organizational blueprint (model
3), which VCs presumably are likely to help shift toward bureaucracy. In addition,
supplementary analyses reveal that firms in which the CEO championed the bureau-
cratic model were significantly more likely to have venture capital and to have had
it longer than all other firms.
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kinds of employees and replacing some individuals as well. Moreover,
respondents emphasized that going public often represents a financial and
symbolic milestone, which, once surpassed, can leave a motivational void.
One founder-CEO of a company engaged in biotechnology instrumen-
tation told our research team:
We worried about the IPO a lot because from the earliest days that was a
clear corporate focal point. Get to the IPO point, get the company public.
It’s the big payoff for people who have stock. Every person in our company
is a stockholder. We grant them options when they join. Everyone worked
very hard for six years to get to that point. Our concern was, after the IPO
and after the lockups expire (so that) people have the ability to sell stock,
we were concerned what the motivation levels in the company would look
like (and) what we could do to influence that motivation level. One thing
we are working very diligently on right now is identifying what the next
corporate milestone will be. 25%–30% growth isn’t the kind of corporate
objective or singularity of purpose that gets people riled up. We are looking
for something a little more specific, like that $100 million benchmark. We’re
in the process of making a final decision of what that overall, superordinate
goal is going to be. (ID #23)
The negative relationship between duration as a public company and
turnover might also reflect vesting of stock options. Among the spells
involving public companies, the typical duration as a public company
was only about two years (with more than 85% of spells involving com-
panies that had been public less than four years). The tendency for turn-
over to decline with duration as a public company might reflect the in-
creasing sway that stock options have as employees approach the vesting
date when those options can be exercised (often three to five years after
the initial public offering).33
As predicted, organizational age has a strong positive effect on employee
turnover, consistent with the notion that younger technology companies
are perceived as offering greater technological challenges and larger pros-
33 In “spline” specifications that restrict the effect of duration to companies that were
already public, the effect is still strongly negative ( ), though only marginallybp0.567
significant ( ). We also experimented with numerous other specifications, in-Pp .068
cluding dummy variables denoting whether these events occurred in a given (or im-
mediately prior) spell and specifications incorporating a time-invariant effect of having
venture capital or being publicly traded. In some of these models, we found significant
effects of having received venture capital or gone public in the prior spell, which
worked in the opposite direction from the effect of duration—that is, turnover declined
in the spell following VC funding, but increased subsequently; and turnover increased
in the spell after companies went public, but subsequently declined the longer firms
had been publicly traded. However, these lagged effects do not persist if employment
change in the preceding spell is controlled, suggesting that the lagged effects on turnover
of receiving VC financing or going public simply reflect the short-term impact of those
events on employment growth and decline.
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pects for financial gain through stock option grants. In some specifications,
organizational growth increased turnover, but the magnitude and signif-
icance of this effect varies depending on the particular specification and
set of observations involved. Turnover tends to be lower in research and
manufacturing companies (as contrasted with computer hardware and
software, medical devices and biotechnology, semiconductors, and tele-
communications and networking). Finally, in supplementary analyses, we
controlled for occupational and gender composition at the end of the first
year of operations for the subset of companies that provided this infor-
mation. Those controls do not appreciably alter the effects associated with
founders’ employment blueprints or changing the blueprint (results avail-
able on request). Hence, our findings do not appear to be artifacts of gross
differences in occupational composition or gender mix.
Overall, the effects of model change persist even after we control for
many other factors that could be expected to influence turnover rates,
including organizational size and growth, age, industry, occupational and
gender composition, and the duration of venture capital financing and
public status.
WHO IS LEAVING: DISENCHANTED OLD GUARD OR MISMATCHED
NEW GUARD?
If altering organizational blueprints changes the skills, values, working
relationships, and routines that have developed within an enterprise, then
turnover associated with changing blueprints should be concentrated dis-
proportionately among more senior employees. Our data do not permit a
direct test of this prediction. However, companies completing our HR
survey did provide a tenure distribution for the firm (the fraction of the
labor force with tenure of six months or less, seven to twelve months,
etc.) at the time of the interview (1994 or 1995). To examine this issue,
we conducted exploratory analyses, predicting the percentage of employ-
ees in 1994–95 having six months or less tenure in the firm. These analyses
were limited to the last spell for which we had information within each
firm (1994 or 1995). We included as predictors the same covariates as in
model 2 of table 4, as well as contemporaneous and lagged measures of
turnover. For firms interviewed in 1995, there is some potential ambiguity
regarding the time frame to which firms’ responses regarding turnover
rates and tenure distributions pertain. We handled this ambiguity by
performing the analyses in various ways.34 The key results of interest are
34 The 1995 survey form asked for the firm’s current tenure distribution but inadver-
tently asked for turnover data pertaining to the first half of 1994 (as we had requested
for firms interviewed in mid-1994). Some companies interviewed in 1995 provided, on
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stable across specifications and subsamples analyzed and are unaffected
by weighting, so we report (in table 7) only one set of those analyses,
which are unweighted.
Table 7 reveals that change in the employment blueprint has a strong
and significant positive effect on the fraction of a firm’s workforce having
tenure of six months or less. In other words, the more a firm had changed
its organizational blueprint by 1994–95, the larger the fraction of recently
hired employees on its payroll, even controlling for recent turnover ex-
perience.35 Because we have controlled for turnover in the analysis, the
effect of model change cannot be attributed simply to the higher levels
of turnover experienced by firms that changed their employment blue-
print. Rather, a more plausible explanation for this effect holds that firms
experienced turnover disproportionately from their old guard when em-
ployment blueprints changed, consistent with hypothesis 2.
This interpretation is buttressed by parallel analyses in table 7, model
2, that focus on the size of the most senior tenure cohort in the firm (five
or more years). Companies that changed their employment blueprint most
have a significantly smaller proportion of old-guard employees. Effects
of other variables in the analysis seem quite plausible—for instance, the
their own initiative, turnover data for all of 1994 and the first half of 1995. In one set
of analyses, we excluded firms that were interviewed in 1995 but that did not provide
turnover data pertaining to the same time period as the tenure distribution. In other
analyses, we constructed a new lagged turnover measure for year , equal to (a)t 1
1993 turnover for firms interviewed in 1994; (b) turnover in 1994 for firms interviewed
in 1995 that also provided turnover data for 1995; and (c) turnover in the first half of
1994 for firms interviewed in 1995 that did not furnish any more recent turnover data.
In another variant, we restricted the analysis to firms interviewed in 1994. These
analyses produced results comparable to those reported in table 7, which handles the
ambiguity by: (a) including a dummy variable for whether or not a given firm provided
contemporaneous turnover data for the same time period as the tenure distribution;
(b) controlling for 1994 vs. 1995 interview year; and (c) permitting the effect of lagged
turnover to vary between firms that did versus did not furnish contemporaneous
turnover data.
35 Turnover in the prior year generally has a negative effect on the size of the “new
guard,” presumably because firms experiencing high turnover in the previous year
hired replacements, who had already accumulated more than six months’ seniority
within the firm. However, model 1 in table 7 reveals an exception: among firms in-
terviewed in 1995 that did not provide contemporaneous turnover data for 1995, lagged
turnover exhibits a positive relationship with the fraction of employees hired in the
last six months. One possible explanation for this result is that these firms (all studied
in 1995) were (justifiably) confused by the different time frames to which the turnover
and tenure questions pertained, and they unwittingly reported their tenure distribution
for 1994 and/or their recent (1995) turnover experience instead of consistently providing
information pertaining to 1994 or 1995 (i.e., it is because they had a relatively low
tenure workforce in 1994 that they display higher turnover in 1995). This would
account for the appearance of a significant positive relationship between reported
turnover and the size of the recently hired contingent.
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fraction of senior employees is larger in older companies, in those that
were larger in their first year of operations, and in those founded along
commitment lines.36 Recognizing that not all firms in the sample had been
in existence for five years, we also replicated these analyses on the subset
of companies that were five years old or more as of the start of the spell,
and the results (available on request) were comparable to those reported
in table 7.
We cannot make strong inferences on this issue, given the considerable
limitations of the data available to us. However, these exploratory results
seem consistent with the view that adopting a new organizational model
increases turnover principally by dislocating the old guard.
TURNOVER AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
We have argued that the tendency for changes in organizational blueprints
to increase turnover is interesting for numerous reasons, irrespective of
the relationship between turnover and firm performance. Nonetheless, we
wish to test the prediction, derived from ecological perspectives, that the
disruptions occasioned by turnover destabilize organizations and ad-
versely affect performance. We report a preliminary analysis of the re-
lationship between turnover and one compelling indicator of performance:
revenue growth. Bear in mind that many young technology companies
are incurring significant set-up costs that might dampen profitability, such
as conducting basic research, developing distribution channels, building
infrastructure, and so on. Hence, the ability to accelerate the flow of
revenues is a reasonable indicator of early success in young technology
companies, one over which the labor force has some control and one that
is tracked closely by external constituencies and stakeholders. In addition,
the data we analyze on revenue growth were provided by the companies
to independent sources—annual reports to the SEC (for public companies)
and annual editions of the Technology Resource Guide to Greater Silicon
Valley (a commercial database distributed by CorpTech)—rather than
directly to us, reducing the chance of any bias.
We model performance by relating revenues (in $100,000s) in year
to: (a) revenues in year T; (b) average turnover in years andT 2 T 1
T; and (c) other controls (described below). We calculated each firm’s
average turnover rate over the last two spells for which it provided data
(for most firms, 1993 and the first half of 1994; for a few firms, 1994 and
36 Not surprisingly, with age, size, and growth controlled, the effect of recent turnover
on the relative size of the most senior tenure cohort is modest.
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TABLE 7
Determinants of Tenure Distribution of Employees in 1994–95: OLS Estimates
Variable
% with Six Months Tenure
or Less
% with Five Years Tenure
or More
b t prob 1 d t d b t prob 1 d t d
CEO’s vs. founder’s model: N dimensions changed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.078 2.473 .016 4.562 2.051 .045
Founder’s model:
Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.933 .628 .533 23.604 2.773 .007
Star . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.176 .143 .887 11.992 1.346 .183
Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.029 .280 .781 7.813 .994 .324
Autocracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.603 .930 .356 9.037 .808 .422
Aberrant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.728 .916 .363 12.150 1.527 .132
Turnover (square root), prior year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.682 3.078 .003 .227 .113 .910
Turnover (square root), prior year # contemporaneous turnover . . . 8.135 3.764 .000 .239 .102 .919
Employment (square root), start of spell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .302 .673 .504 .521 1.070 .289
Employment (square root), end of year 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .592 1.008 .317 2.422 3.807 .000
Duration of first CEO (years) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .135 .116 .908 1.420 1.124 .266
Change in CEO during spell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.636 .747 .458 2.497 .474 .637
2  CEOs as of start of spell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.162 .241 .811 2.171 .415 .680
Duration of VC funding (years, square root) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.878 1.601 .115 1.171 .601 .550
Duration of public status (years, square root) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .775 .226 .822 4.628 1.246 .218
Age at start of spell (years) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .792 .692 .492 4.512 3.640 .001
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Industry:
Manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.552 .642 .523 12.532 1.633 .108
Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.511 .351 .727 3.431 .316 .753
Firm-provided contemporaneous turnover data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.432 1.154 .253 5.098 .576 .567
Interview year (1995 vs. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.484 1.382 .172 8.574 .952 .345
Constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22,922.940 1.383 .172 17,123.540 .954 .344
R2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .494 .621
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .prob 1 F .001 .000
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the first half of 1995).37 We transform revenues into the square root metric
to deal with nonlinearities and to accommodate firms with zero revenues
at either or both time points. The regressors include firm age at year T,
the time period to which turnover data pertain for the firm (1993–94 or
1994–95), change in the organizational blueprint (number of dimensions,
0–3), and employment growth (the ratio of employment in 1994 to 1993).
The last variable is included to control for the possibility that any observed
effect of turnover on revenue growth reflects downsizing.
Table 8 reports WLS estimates for the 54 companies with complete
data.38 The table reveals a significant negative effect of turnover on rev-
enue growth, consistent with hypothesis 3. This effect of turnover is quite
robust across different specifications, functional forms, and measures of
turnover.39 Thus, changes in the organizational model not only foster
turnover, but that turnover appears to have adverse consequences for
organizational performance, at least in the short run, consistent with the
ecological perspective.
ISSUES OF CAUSALITY AND OMITTED VARIABLES
The available data do not permit definitive conclusions about the causal
relationships between model change, turnover rates, and organizational
performance. We cannot tell for sure when employment models changed
(if they did), and hence causality could run in the other direction: firms
experiencing higher turnover might change their employment models in
an effort to stem that turnover. Though we cannot rule out this competing
account, various pieces of evidence argue against it. First, recall that we
found that the (time-varying) effects of CEO succession on turnover tend
to vanish once we control for model change. In other words, our time-
37 Firms generally reported on turnover through the middle of the year in which they
were interviewed (1994 or 1995). Consequently, because the turnover rate reported for
year T pertains only to first half of that year, whereas the report for year pertainedT 1
to an entire year, we weighted the rate for twice the rate for T in calculatingT 1
our measure of average turnover.
38 Not surprisingly, the revenue growth data are heteroscedastic, with larger error
variance among smaller firms, so we weight observations as a function of 1994 em-
ployment. Other weighting schemes, such as revenues at year T or employment av-
eraged over several years, produce comparable results, as do analyses that control for
the possibility of non-random missing data (detailed results available on request).
39 In supplementary analyses, e.g., we also controlled for other potential determinants
of organizational performance, such as changes in CEO, the fraction of the firm’s
workforce in sales occupations (and change in that fraction since founding), and
whether and for how long the firm had been public and/or received venture capital
financing. The basic results in table 8 were unchanged (detailed results available on
request).
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TABLE 8
Determinants of Revenue Growth: WLS Regression
Variable b b t P
Revenues in $100,000 (square root), year T . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.198 .939 31.426 !.001
Average annual turnover rate, years and T . . . . .T 1 .124 .094 2.973 .005
Employment growth (ratio of year T to ) . . . . . . . .T 1 .989 .087 3.376 .002
CEO’s vs. founder’s model: N dimensions changed . . . .541 .046 1.385 .173
Firm age, year T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .210 .044 1.649 .106
Indicator for year T * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.309 .030 1.087 .283
Constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.529 1.811 .077
Note.—Dependent variable is the square root of revenues (in $100,000s) for year . ObservationsT 2
(Np54) weighted by 1994 employment size. Mean (SD) of dependent variable is 12.601 (11.7243), based
on weighted data. R2 p .970; adjusted R2 p .967.
* ;1995p 1 1994p 0.
invariant measure of model change mediates the effects of the time-
varying measures of CEO succession and cumulative number of CEOs.
This suggests that executive succession disrupts organizations when it
entails changes in employment blueprints. Second, study of respondent
interview transcripts reveals numerous mentions of changes in premises
(“culture”) as being disruptive and divisive. But, we cannot find any men-
tions of changes in premises in response to unacceptably high (or low)
turnover.
Moreover, several results in table 5 make no sense, in our view, under
reverse causality. For instance, turnover is particularly high for changes
from aberrant blueprints to autocracy (row 15b), from one nontype model
to another (row 9), and from commitment or star to aberrant (row 7).
Firms facing high turnover seem unlikely to have responded by under-
taking these particular transitions, whereas it is straightforward to un-
derstand why these transitions might cause high turnover.
We also investigated whether the arrival of a new CEO, changes to
the organizational model, and high turnover might all arise because of
some unobserved crisis. We found that distinguishing spells in which a
firm’s employment declined by 10% or more does not alter materially the
pattern of findings we reported above, suggesting our results do not simply
capture large-scale downsizings.40 We also utilized qualitative information
from interviews and surveys to code whether the founder reported that
any of the following events occurred within a given firm–year spell: (1)
40 As one might expect, there was moderate positive effect of current employment
decline (during the spell) on turnover (e.g., in a model only controlling for age, bp
; ; ). However, the other covariates in our model capture many0.499 zp 2.158 Pp .031
of the factors associated with the likelihood of decline, and controlling for those var-
iables weakens the effect ( ; ; ).bp 0.378 zp 1.451 Pp .147
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major downsizings or office closings; (2) general financial or legal turmoil,
such as large losses, cash flow problems, market collapse, and law suits;
(3) major executive changes; and (4) other executive changes (e.g., de-
parture of a chief technical officer). All four dislocating events have pos-
itive effects on turnover. Nonetheless, the effect of changing the organi-
zational blueprint remains positive and highly significant even when we
control for these milestone events. Nor were the results appreciably
changed when we included controls for evidence of a change in business
strategy within the firm. These supplementary results offer some reas-
surance that our analyses do not overlook some major factor that produced
the observed associations between changes in employment blueprints,
turnover, and organizational performance.
CONCLUSION
Organizational theorists, particularly ecologists, have emphasized the dis-
ruptive effects of fundamental organizational change. Such change is
thought to destabilize organizations primarily by altering the premises,
values, and routines that organizational members have come to internalize
(for a programmatic statement, see Hannan and Freeman [1984]). Ac-
cordingly, we have tried to get closer to the mechanisms at the heart of
theories of organizational inertia, by (1) operationalizing the premises
(employment models) on which founders built their new organizations,
(2) measuring changes over time in those premises, (3) relating those
changes to employee turnover, and (4) exploring the effect of turnover on
organizational performance. If altering organizational premises dislocates,
then this should be clearly manifested in turnover, especially among the
most senior employees within an organization. Turnover seems an espe-
cially appropriate indicator of the disruptive effects of organizational
change within the setting we examined—high-technology companies in
Silicon Valley—because retaining the key human assets in young tech-
nology firms is often viewed by senior management, investors, and other
informed parties as a crucial requirement for organizational survival and
success.
We found considerable evidence that changing organizational blue-
prints fuels employee turnover, which is concentrated disproportionately
among old-guard employees. Turnover, in turn, adversely affects the
ability
of young firms to grow their revenues (at least in the short run), a crucial
dimension of performance for emerging technology companies. On bal-
ance, our results support the claim by neoinstitutionalists and organiza-
tional ecologists (following Stinchcombe 1965) that cultural blueprints are
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superimposed by founders on nascent organizations, as well as ecologists’
claim that altering such blueprints is disruptive and destabilizing.
A broad conclusion of this analysis, and of others using the SPEC data,
is that origins matter. Future research should devote more attention to
conceptualizing and measuring how cultural blueprints are selected and
imprinted on organizations during their infancy; how they are sustained,
modified, or discarded over time. Such studies would not only sharpen
organizational theory but also shed light on some important real-world
issues, such as the conditions under which firms find it relatively easy or
difficult to merge or to transplant a particular organizational model into
a new country or line of business. Moreover, additional work along these
lines is needed to gauge whether our two main findings—that changes in
employment blueprints fuel turnover in Silicon Valley high-tech start-ups,
and that turnover in turn adversely affects organizational perform-
ance—generalize to other organization-building activities, other kinds of
enterprises, other environments, and other stages of organizational
development.
However, pursuing this research agenda will require some adjustments
to conventional research methodology. It obviously requires collecting
observations that pertain to multiple points in time, beginning at the
origins of the enterprise. It also requires analyzing the resulting panel
data in non-standard ways. As we noted above, the current standard in
analyzing panel data on organizations is a fixed-effects approach. How-
ever, each organization’s initial conditions are constant over its history.
Thus, origins are swept out of the picture in a fixed-effects analysis. What
seems needed is to employ analytic methods, such as those used in this
article, that allow flexible specification of models in which both fixed and
age-varying characteristics affect levels and changes in outcomes of in-
terest. Further development and refinement of such approaches should
be high on the agenda for organizational analysis.
Our detailed analyses of firms’ transitions suggest that the disruptive
effects of changing organizational blueprints depend significantly on firms’
origin and destination states. Abandoning a coherent model proved to be
particularly destabilizing, especially if the founder embraced the com-
mitment or star model, but not if the firm migrated away from bureauc-
racy or autocracy. Similarly, firms experienced markedly different turn-
over rates in transitioning to particular destination states, such as
bureaucracy, as a function of their initial blueprint. The engineering
model, in contrast, appeared to be relatively more flexible and adaptable
(i.e., easier to dismantle and easier to migrate to) than various other mod-
els. Perhaps this offers some insight into its widespread prevalence in
Silicon Valley. Not only does the engineering model seem to be a relatively
hospitable origin and destination state, but retaining that model over time
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might also expose firms to less severe forms of misalignment than, say,
retaining the commitment or star or autocratic model. Put differently, the
engineering model might have less upside but also less downside risk,
compared to more fragile and distinctive models, such as the commitment
or star blueprint, which entail greater potential returns and risks. Organ-
izational ecologists might profitably examine how different blueprints or
models fare competitively under different environmental circumstances.
Scholars and practitioners alike extol the virtues of creating and sus-
taining a coherent and consistent system of practices concerning employ-
ment relations. Yet our results suggest that complementarity, consistency,
and salience are not unqualified assets for an organizational model. Those
very same attributes might help explain, for instance, the high turnover
that firms experienced when moving to bureaucracy or autocracy: if Sil-
icon Valley “techies” tend to dislike bureaucracy and autocracy, they dis-
like them most in their purest, most consistent, and most salient incar-
nations. We still know remarkably little about the parameters and
consequences of consistency: what determines the degree to which a sys-
tem of beliefs or HR practices gets perceived as consistent, and how/when
organizations specifically benefit from such consistency (for a notable ex-
ception, see Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi [1997]).
Moreover, achieving and sustaining consistency in employment systems
raises complicated dynamic trade-offs. Some transition paths from foun-
der’s to CEO’s blueprint seem to be particularly disruptive for organi-
zations, underscoring the point that organizational design should attend
to more than just getting the model “right.” It should also balance the
benefits of getting the right model against the costs associated with tran-
sitioning to that model. As an organization and its environment change,
the merits of a given model are likely to change as well. However, the
economic, social, and psychological costs associated with dismantling the
previous blueprint and implementing a new one might outweigh the con-
tent advantages offered by the new blueprint. Hence, in some ecologies
and for some strategies, adhering faithfully to a second-best (or even third-
best) model might be superior to rapid oscillation among shorter-lived,
first-best models. This issue of balancing stability versus change—and
weighing the benefits of altering organizational arrangements against the
adjustment costs involved in making those changes—has received little
attention from organizational analysts and those interested in employment
systems and human resource practices. The strong complementarities
among elements of a firm’s employment system, coupled with employees’
strong emotional attachments to personnel practices, might make these
trade-offs particularly complex in the domain of human resource man-
agement. Future research should examine these trade-offs and how they
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vary across types of organizations, environments, and employment
practices.
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